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Appellants respond to appellees Brief as follows: 
Statement of Facts. 
Appellees' absurd remark that "Stichtings have not marshalled the evidence and have, 
without record citation set forth selective and misleading statement of facts" should be ignored. 
On appeals from a dismissal, there are no findings of fact as to which evidence can be 
marshalled, and the established facts are those asserted in the Complaint. 
The course of proceedings below is demonstrated by the decisions below by the federal 
court and the District Court. 
Summary of Argument 
The ruling below, and appellees' defense of it, are based upon failure to understand the 
meaning of "abstention". 
Appellees moved to dismiss in the federal district court on the ground of lack of 
jurisdiction. Appellees' memorandum in support of their Motion is attached. The court refused 
to treat the motion as one to dismiss, because it found that it had jurisdiction. Instead it treated 
the motion as requesting that it refrain from exercising its jurisdiction; that is, it treated the 
motion as seeking abstention. 
Appellees and the District Court appear not to realize that a court cannot abstain from 
jurisdiction it does not have. 
The federal district court necessarily held that it had diversity jurisdiction of appellants' 
Complaint. It abstained from exercising such jurisdiction, with leave to re-file in the State 
Court. Abstention does not erase jurisdiction nunc pro tunc to the date of filing. 
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The ruling below speaks as if the District Court believed that a "statute of limitations" 
contained in § 10-9-100 l(2)(a) is not tolled by filing in one of two courts having jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff must pick the right court. 
This translates instantly into a ruling that the statute may alter the ordinary affect of filing 
under the federal court's diversity jurisdiction. There is no question that a State law cause of 
action may be filed in federal court, tolling any applicable statute of limitation.1 The District 
Court now says that this is not the case if the statute requires filing in "the district court". 
Setting aside whether the statute demonstrates any intent of the Legislature to have an 
unconstitutional affect, it is inarguable that the Legislature could not do so even if it wanted to. 
Appellee's claim that the Complaint does not recite exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is false. Appellees apparently do not claim that the Park City Land Management Code 
provides any "remedy" which appellants did not exhaust, merely that appellants1 attempt to 
exhaust their remedies was technically defective. This is not an issue which can be raised on 
appeal, not having having been raised below. 
In fact, the issues whether the federal court had jurisdiction, whether the matter could be 
re-filed in the State court, and whether appellants had exhausted available administrative 
remedies, all had been submitted by appellees to the federal court and decided by it against 
them. These issues were all res judicata between these parties before the matter reached the 
State court. 
1
 The District Court complains that "Mayflower does not cite a single case . . . that filing 
in a federal court that subsequently abstains... should toll the limitations period". With respect, 
Mayflower assumed the District Court would not misconceive the matter of abstention, or the 
plain effect of the federal court ruling. 
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Argument 
The District Court apparently believes that filing in the "wrong" court is not "filing". 
Thus, for example, the District Court suggests that "'the district court'" referred to in the statute is 
"the State district court where the decision is made by a land use body". Ruling at 8. Thus, 
filing in a State district court in "another county" would not suffice, notwithstanding the usual 
rule that limitations are tolled even by filing in the wrong venue. 
The statute, however, nowhere suggests that it re-defines "filing" for purposes of statutes 
of limitation. The District Court is wrong in presuming that filing in an incorrect venue will not 
stop the running of a statute of limitations. As a general proposition, mistakes of venue do not 
affect jurisdiction. Further, of course, venue in the federal court was entirely proper in this case. 
The District Court's ruling is summarized in a single passage, which demonstrates its 
misapprehension of both federal diversity jurisdiction and abstention: 
Mayflower's complaint filed in federal district court was filed under diversity 
jurisdiction and its sole cause of action was for violation of the Utah Code. Mayflower 
should have known that there was at least a possibility that the federal court would 
abstain from hearing the matter in favor of a state court. Land use matters are 
certainly traditionally state concerns. State courts are not forbidden from entertaining 
constitutional claims of discrimination either. Mayflower should have also known it 
was taking a risk where the limitations period was only 30 days. Nevertheless, 
Mayflower chose to take that risk and file in federal district court. 
Order October 5, 2006 at 11. 
Apparently, the District Court found odd the filing of actions arising under the Utah Code 
in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. In fact, it is a commonplace. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
gives the federal court original jurisdiction of State law causes of action between parties of 
diverse citizenship. 
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Apparently, the District Court believes that federal courts abstain at will in such cases. In 
fact, abstention is extraordinary. Indeed, federal abstention even in cases of "traditional state 
concerns" is virtually unheard of in cases of diversity, rather than pendent, jurisdiction. See cases 
cited in the federal court ruling in this matter. 
In any case, "a federal court cannot abstain until it is satisfied as to its own jurisdiction". 
Miller-Davis Co, v. 77/. State Toll Hwy Auth, 567 F.2d. 323, 326 (7 Cir. 1977). The federal 
court here plainly found that it had diversity jurisdiction of the Complaint: it did not abstain 
from exercising jurisdiction it did not belive it had. 
Further, a federal court may not abstain under Burfordv. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 
(1943), as occurred here, unless it first finds that timely and adequate State court review is 
available. Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 771 (3 Cir. 1995). That is why the federal court in the 
persent case abstained without prejudice to refile in the State court. Furthermore, of course, 
under § 78-22-40, U.C.A. (1953), the time in which to re-file was extended for a year following 
a dismissal other than on the merits. See Rhoads v. Wright, 622 P.2d. 343, 350-51 (Utah 1980). 
Mayflower took no risk, unless the District Court is correct that a State statute or State 
court can restrict federal diversity jurisdiction. 
Both the issue whether the federal district court had jurisdiction, and whether the 
complaint could be re-filed in the State court, were res judicata as between these parties before 
the District Court's ruling of October 5,2006. They are necessary underpinnings of the federal 
court ruling. So was the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Appellees had fully 
presented this claim in a companion Motion for Sanctions to the federal court, which had 
rejected i t See paragraph 1 of the federal ruling. Had appellees wished relief from these 
rulings, they were required to address the matter to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
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The District Court was fully advised of these matters by the federal court's ruling. While 
the latter ruling does not directly treat the rejected claim of failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies, the District Court was advised when the matter was raised by surprise at hearing. 
The District Court apparently believes that an abstention incorporates a finding of no 
jurisdiction, or constitutes a rejection of jurisdiction nunc pro tunc to the date of filing. Both 
assumptions are false. 
This raises squarely the question whether the District Court's finding that, unless filed in 
a State District Court, a complaint asserting violations of the State land use code is ineffective, 
does not impose limitations upon federal diversity juridiction. Effectively, the District Court 
holds that the limitation period ran while the federal court had asserted jurisdiction and was 
dealing with the matter (and long before the federal court abstained). 
Despite the District Court's assurance that the phrase "the district court" in the statute 
must mean the State District Court in which venue is proper, nothing in the statute says so. It is 
at least as likely that the Legislature knew about federal diversity jurisdiction and the Supremacy 
Clause, and knew that once it made municipalities subject to suit for land use code violations, 
they were so subject in both State and federal district courts. See Wojciechowski v. Harriman, 
607 F. Supp. 631, 633, 635 (D. N.M. 1985); Wildner Contracting Co., Inc. v. Ohio Turnpike 
Commission, 913 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (N.D. Ohio 1996). Nothing in the statutory scheme (or in 
any State court case rendered under it) suggests a belief that a federal court cannot satisfactorily 
decide whether a municipality has violated its land use code. 
In fact, however, the issue of choice of courts is simply a false issue. Appellees do not 
seriously claim that the State could limit federal diversity jurisdiction in that way. Since the 
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State cannot do so, there is no reason to apply to the statute an unnecessary construction that it 
did 
Appellees attempt to distinguish McGary v. City of Bethlehem, 45 F. Supp. 385, 386 
(E.D. Pa. 1942), on the ground that the District Court's ruling requires only that claims under the 
land use code to be brought in the State District Court where venue is proper, not that all actions 
against municipalities be brought in State court.2 That is, the District Court's ruling is only a 
partial limitation on federal jurisdiction. The simple answer to this is that no limitation is 
permitted. Sacramento Mun. Util Dist. v. P.G. & E. Co., 128 P.2d. 529, 532 (Calif.1942). 
Appellees do not attempt to distinguish any of the other cases cited by appellants. Otherwise, 
appellees purport that this is merely a dispute about the State's ability to enact limitations. In 
fact, no one disputes the State's authority to enact limitations; neither does anyone dispute that 
this matter was filed in the federal court within the 30 days limited in the statute. The issue is 
whether the State can so limit the jurisdiction of the federal court that filing there does not toll 
the limitations. See Keyser v. Pollock, 59 Pac. 87 (Utah 1899); Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d. 564 
(U. Apps 2000). Plainly, it cannot. 
Exhaustion of Remedies 
Appellees now assert not that appellants had administrative remedies to exhaust which 
they did not attempt to exhaust, as found by the District Court, but that there were technical 
defects in appellants1 filings exhausting these remedies, and that exhaustion was not properly 
alleged in the Complaint. 
2
 Appellees misconstrue McGary, which dealt with a state statute applicable only to 
"cities of third class which lie in more than one county", not to cities generally. 
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Since neither of these matters was raised below, or ruled upon by the District Court, they 
cannot be raised now. Further, they are palpable nonsense. 
The Complaint plainly recites exhaustion of available remedies: 
14. May 25, 2005, the Park City Planning Commission, over the objections of 
plaintiffs, approved the subdivision of UPCMfs land adjoining the Marsac Claim on 
the southeast, and known as the Village at Empire Pass (POD A) West side. 
15. May 2, 2005, the City Council of Park City, over the objection of plaintiffs, 
approved the Village at Empire Pass (POD A) West side. A copy of said objection 
is attched hereto as Exhibit "A". 
The letter, Exhibt"A", incorporated in the Complaint, plainly asks that the subject plat "be 
modified so as not to landlock the part of the Marsac Claim lying north of the buildings 
numbered 4 and 5M. A copy of the Complaint is attached hereto. 
No case, including Concerned Parents v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d. 629, 636 (Utah 1982) cited 
by appellees, suggests that where the complaint pleads all facts demonstrating exhaustion of 
remedies, the complaint is defective. Certainly, that could not be the rule where the issue of 
exhausion of remedies is res judicata. 
In a Motion for Sanctions specifically denied by the federal court in its order abstaining 
from exercise of its jurisdiction, appellees folly raised the issue of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in this case. The pertinent memoranda demonstrating this fact are attached. 
The federal court's ruling abstaining from jurisdiction incorporates a ruling that the court 
had jurisdiction of the Complaint because, among other things, exhaustion of remedies was 
shown. 
Appellees claims that the form of appellants1 appeal to the Park City Council was 
somehow inadequate, cannot be raised on this appeal. To the extent that these claims are not 
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merely risible, they are wholly unproven. Upon what proof, for example, do appellees claim that 
a copy of the appeal letter was not sent to the City Recorder? 
If appellees wish to raise these matters, and are not barred by res judicata from doing so, 
they must do so in the District Court. 
Otherwise appellees* presentation on administrative remedies confesses the error of the 
District Court ruling: quibbles as to form aside, there were no further remedies yet to be 
exhausted. 
Conclusions 
The ruling appealed, in addition to reversing decisions of the federal court res judicata 
between these parties, imposes a construction upon § 10-9-801(2), U.C.A. (1953) which is 
plainly unconstitutional. The ruling should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 18th day of May, 2007. 
E. Craig Sifiay 
Attorney fSr Appellants/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing"REPLY BRIEF" was sent 
this 18th day of May, 2007, postage pre-paid by U.S. Mail to the following: 
Attorneys for United Park City Mines, Co.: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. (#0557) 
Clark K. Taylor (#5354) 
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VANCOTT BAGLEY 
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50 S. Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058 
Attorneys for East West Partners 
Mark R. Gaylord (#5073) 
Craig H. Howe (#7522) 
Matthew L. Moncur (#9894) 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 S. Main St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221 
Telephone: (801) 531-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 3001 
Attorneys for Park City Municipal Corporation 
Mark Harrington 
PARK CITY ATTORNEY 
P.O. Box 1480 
445 Marsac Avenue 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (435) 615-5029 
Facsimile: (435) 615-4901 
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ATTACHMENTS 
E. Craig Smay #2985 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
Attorney for Mayflower 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, SUMMIT COUNTY 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, Netherlands 
associations; 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
and 
EAST WEST PARTNERS, 
and 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO., 
A DELAWARE CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil Number: C t e O S O O * " 1 0 
Judge: UJBbCfc--
Magistrate Judge: 
(Jury Trial Demanded) 
FILED B ' : ' _ . . 
Plaintiffs complain of defendants, demanding jury trial, and for cause of action allege as 
follows: 
PARTIES. JURISDICTION, VENUE 
1. Plaintiffs are Dutch associations, qualified to do business in Utah. For convenience, 
they are hereinafter sometimes designated "Mayflower". 
2. Defendant Park City Municipal Corporation ("Park City") is a municipality of the State 
of Utah, located in Summit County, Utah. 
3. Defendant United Park City Mines, Co. ("UPCM") is a Delaware Corporation, qualified 
to do business, and doing business, in Summit County, Utah. Upon information and belief, 
defendant East West Partners ("East West") is a Colorado Limited Liability Company, having its 
principle place of business at Avon, Colorado. 
4. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that defendant Park City's approval of defendant UPCM's 
Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side Subdivision without requiring access to plaintiffs' land 
within the same zone invidiously discriminates against plaintiffs' land and violates plaintiffs' 
rights under §10-9-405(2), U.C.A. (1953), and §15-7.3-4, Park City Land Management Code 
("PCLMC"), Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
Sections 7 and 24 of Article 1, Constitution of Utah, to the extent said zoning is valid. Venue is 
proper in Summit County. 
5. The amount in issue exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs. The Court has 
jurisdiction of this proceeding under §10-9a-801, U.C.A. (1953), and Rule 57 U.R.C.P. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
6. Plaintiffs are the owners of land within the municipal limits of Park City, generally 
denominated the Marsac Lode, Claim No. 61, aggregating approximately five acres. 
7. The Marsac Lode has been included by Park City in an eighty-four acre development 
zone, generally denominated the "Mountain Village". The remainder of land included in said zone 
belongs to UPCM, or its successor East West. Though all land within the "Mountain Village" is 
identically zoned, Park City asserts that no land within said zone is entitled to the development 
permitted by such zone except land belonging to UPCM or its successors. 
8. Historically, the Mountain Village area has been accessible from the remainder of Park 
City by State Road 224 ("SR224"), sometimes called Marsac Avenue. 
9. In 2002, in order to maximize developability of its lands within the Mountain Village, 
UPCM, without permission from plaintiffs, relocated SR224 so that it bisected the Marsac claim, 
severing the southeastern approximately two acres thereof from the remainder. 
10. UPCM then dedicated the relocated SR224 to the Utah Department of Transportation 
("UDOT"), which has instituted negotiations with plaintiffs regarding acquisition of title to 
maintain SR224 as relocated across the Marsac Claim. 
11. Construction of SR224 across the Marsac claim creates steep embankments and other 
impediments to access, which render the southeast extension of the Marsac Claim inaccessible, 
except through the property of UPCM. 
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12. All land within the Mountain Village is subject to the burden to provide access to 
adjoining land imposed by § 15-7.3-4, PCLMC. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
13. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference the allegations of paragraphs one through 
twelve hereinabove. 
14. May 25, 2005, the Park City Planning Commission, over the objections of plaintiffs, 
approved the subdivision of UPCM's land adjoining the Marsac Claim on the southeast, and 
known as the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side. 
15. May 26, 2005, the City Council of Park City, over the objection of plaintiffs, approved 
the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side. A copy of said objection is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A". 
16. As a result of said approval, the Marsac Claim has been rendered inaccessible and 
undevelopable, despite §15-7.3-4, PCLMC, as follows: 
Proposed Streets shall be extended to the boundary lines of the tract to be 
subdivided, unless prevented by topography or other physical conditions, or unless 
in the opinion of the Planning Commission such an extension is not necessary for 
the coordination of the layout of the Subdivision with the existing layout of the 
most advantageous future development of adjoining tracts. 
17. To the extent the zoning of the Mountain Village is valid, the failure of defendant Park 
City to enforce its Code requiring provision of access enforces the city's assertion that only one 
owner, UPCM or a successor, may exercise its rights under the zoning, and discriminates against 
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plaintiff and plaintiffs' property in violation of §10-9-405(2), U.C.A. (1953) and of Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Sections 7 and 24 of Article 1, 
Constitution of Utah. Such discrimination, if not corrected, diminishes the value of plaintiffs' 
property in a sum not less than $5 million. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court enter its Order herein forthwith declaring that 
the approval by defendant Park City of the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side subdivision 
violates the rights of plaintiffs under § 10-9-405(2), U.C.A. (1953) and § 15-7.3-4, PCLMC, 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Sections 7 and 24 
of Article 1, Constitution of Utah, insofar as Park City has failed to require the extension of 
proposed streets to the boundary of the subdivided tract with plaintiffs' property in the Marsac 
Claim, and assessing damages therefore in a sum to be shown at trial, not less than $5 million, for 
plaintiffs' costs of pursuing the action, including a reasonable attorney's fee and for such other and 
further relief as the Court deems just in the premises. 
DATED this 19th day of April, 2006. 
MAYFINANCE, C.V. 
P.O. Box 100 
4140ACLEERDAM 
The Netherlands 
E. Craig Smay 
Exhibit "A" 
E. CRAIG SMAY 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8515 
Fax (801)539-8544 
May 26, 2005 
TO Park City Council 
P O Box 682002 
Park City, UT 84068 
VIA FACSIMILE: (435)615-4906 
Gentlemen 
This is to correct errors in, and to register objections to, statements in the Staff 
Report for your meeting Thursday, May 26, 2005, regarding the final plat for the Village 
at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side. 
The Analysis section incorrectly recites that "the adjoining Marsac Claim is still 
undecided as to ownership.1' The ownership of the Marsac Claim has been finally 
decided: it belongs to the Mayflower Stichtings ("Mayflower"). 
Finding of Fact No. 7 is misleading. There are no commitments to maintain 
access over the part of SR 224 which trespasses on the Marsac Claim, nor any 
proceedings instituted to obtain ownership. The UDOT letter attached need not be read 
as saying more than that UDOT will insist upon UPCM providing good title to the 
corridor now occupied by SR 224, or re-establishing the old route, or providing an 
alternative. 
In those circumstances, Conclusion of Law No. 3 is questionable, at best. 
Further, the configuration of roads shown on the plat appears to deny access to the 
parts of the Marsac Claim which have not been improperly used for SR 224. The plat 
should be modified so as not to landlock the part of the Marsac Claim lying north of the 
buildings numbered 4 and 5 
Very truly yours, 
E. Craig Smay 
Attorney for Mayflower 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
CLARK K. TAYLOR (5354) 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058 
Attorneys for Defendant, United Park City 
Mines Company 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, Netherlands 
associations, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, 
And 
EAST WEST PARTNERS, 
And 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, I 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO. 
MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
& ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND 
PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL FOR 
FRIVOLOUS COMPLAINT AND 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil Number: 2:05CV00525 TS 
Honorable Ted Stewart 
United States District Judge 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AND POSITION 1 
ARGUMENT 3 
I. THE PURPOSE OF RULE 11, TO DISCOURAGE FRIVOLOUS 
AND VEXATIOUS LITIGATION, WARRANT THE COURT IMPOSING 
SANCTIONS FOR STICHTING MAYFLOWERS' FRIVOLOUS 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 3 
II. THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE RULE 11 SANCTIONS AND AWARD 
UNITED PARK ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS BECAUSE 
STICHTING MAYFLOWERS' AMENDED COMPLAINT IS 
UNQUESTIONABLY FRIVOLOUS 5 
1. Stichting Mayflowers Have Failed Inexplicably to Exhaust 
State Administrative and Judicial Remedies 5 
2. Federal Case Law Supports Rule 11 Sanctions for Failure 
to Exhaust Administrative and Judicial Sanctions 8 
III. THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11 
BECAUSE THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS FILED FOR THE 
IMPROPER PURPOSE OF CONTINUING STICHTING MAYFLOWERS' 
BAD FAITH HARASSMENT AND DELAY OF UNITED PARK 9 
CONCLUSION 10 
(i) 
United Park City Mines Company ("United Park"), through its counsel of record, 
herewith submits this Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions & Attorney Fees and Costs Against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel For 
Frivolous Complaint and Amended Complaint. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AND POSITION 
Both the Complaint and the Amended Complaint filed by the Plaintiffs, Stichting 
Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds, (collectively 
"Stichting Mayflowers") are frivolous pleadings requiring the entry of sanctions under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Amended Complaint is nothing more than an 
attempt to make this Court a local review board of planning and zoning decisions of the 
City Council and Planning Commission of Park City, Utah. The unmistakable evidence 
of this fact is that Plaintiffs' Prayer for Relief asks this Court to declare that the planning 
approval of the Park City Council of the "Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side 
Subdivision" violates Stichting Mayflowers' rights under a state statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-405(2), and § 15-7.3-4 of the Park City Land Management Code. See Am. 
Compl. Prayer for Relief, p. 4. Of course, that is an issue that is required to be appealed 
from the Park City Council to the Park City Board of Adjustment. PCLMC § 5-10-1. 
The controlling law is unequivocal that a party must exhaust their state remedies 
before resorting to the federal courts, and that a federal court will not sit as a reviewing 
board of a municipal planning and zoning decision when the party has clear state and 
municipal remedies to pursue. The Utah statutory proviso under the Utah Municipal 
Code, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(1), as well as the Park City Land Management 
Code § 5-10-1, require that a party desiring to challenge a municipality land use 
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decision shall exhaust its administrative remedies before a challenge may be made in 
state, much less federal, court. Utah statute further requires that a party, after seeking 
the review of a municipality land decision before the municipal Board of Adjustment, 
shall have thirty (30) days within which to appeal such Board of Adjustment decision to V t / L 
the state district court. The Stichting Mayflower Plaintiffs concede that they have 
neither filed an appeal before the Park City Board of Adjustment nor have they filed an 
appeal to the state district court. 
No "reasonable, competent" lawyer could conclude that under these extant 
circumstances, a justiciable cause of action as set out in Stichting Mayflowers7 
Amended Complaint, could be sustained. Plaintiffs' counsel is charged with the 
unexceptional knowledge that the exhaustion of state remedies doctrine is a 
fundamental principle of federalism of this Court and that this Court will not be used as a 
forum for any party to litigate a local, municipality planning and zoning decision involving 
state and municipal law, where plain state remedies exist The Amended Complaint 
does not suggest that a federal subject matter question is present. 
On top of this, Stichting Mayflowers' Amended Complaint, is premised upon a 
knowingly false statement. Paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint states that 
"Plaintiffs are the owners of land within the municipal limits of Park City, generally 
denominated the Marsac Lode, Claim No. 61, aggregating approximately five acres." In 
point of law, Stichting Mayflowers are not the owners of the Marsac Mining Claim No. 
61, but rather only a claimant of the Marsac property. Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower 
Mountain Fonds, 2005 UT App 279, 528 UT Adv. Rep. 37 (see Attach. 1). The Plaintiffs 
have failed to advise this Court of that fact. 
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The Amended Complaint is the latest tactic of a continuing strategy of Stichting 
Mayflowers to delay, harass, obstruct, and interfere with the efforts of United Park to 
develop its Empire Pass Project, a project under the aegis and authority of the Park City 
Planning Commission and City Council. See earlier case.1 
United Park has fully complied with the pre-filing requirements of Rule 11(c). On 
July 18, 2005, United Park served via hand delivery its Rule 11 Demand Upon Plaintiffs 
And Plaintiffs' Counsel, E. Craig Smay, To Withdraw Plaintiffs'Complaint And Amended 
Complaint And To Voluntarily Dismiss Said Amended Complaint, accompanied by a 
copy of the Rule 11 Motion which is now filed concurrently with this Memorandum. See 
Attach.. 2. The twenty-one (21) day pre-filing period under Rule 11(c) expired August 8, 
2005 and Stichting Mayflowers have not withdrawn or otherwise amended their frivolous 
Amended Complaint. 
Stichting Mayflowers' Amended Complaint is frivolous under the governing 
precedent and plain meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. It should be 
stricken, the Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel should be sanctioned under Rule 11 in a 
sum not less than $50,000 as determined by this Honorable Court, and by an award of 
attorneys fees to United Park for bringing this Motion. 
ARGUMENT 
«- THE PURPOSE OF RULE 11, TO DISCOURAGE FRIVOLOUS AND 
VEXATIOUS LITIGATION, WARRANT THE COURT IMPOSING SANCTIONS 
FOR STICHTING MAYFLOWERS5 FRIVOLOUS AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
Rule 11 in its current form was promulgated to discourage vexatious and 
frivolous complaints like the Amended Complaint filed by Stichting Mayflowers. Judge 
1
 Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, et al, v. Park City, United Park City Mines, et al. Case No. 
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Winder of this Court explained: 
"Rule 11 is 'aimed at curbing abuses of the judicial system1 by requiring 
litigants to certify that any papers filed are well founded." 
United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Durbano Constr. Co., 144 F.R.D. 402, 408 (D. Utah. 1992) 
(quoting Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters. Inc., 498 U.S. 
533,542(1991)). 
The signature required under Rule 11 "'certifies to the court that the signer has 
read the document, has conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law and is 
satisfied that the document is well-grounded in both, and is acting without any improper 
motive.1" kL (quoting Business Guides, Inc., 498 U.S. at 543, 111 S. Ct. at 929). For a 
false certification as to these representations, Rule 11 sanctions are required and are 
designed "to 'reduce frivolous claims, defenses, or motions, and to deter costly 
meritless maneuvers.1" Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 
2003) (quoting Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
Pleadings that are frivolous and filed for an impermissible purpose, such as to 
harass and delay, unfairly burden the Court, as well as the parties, sapping this Court's 
valuable resources. As stated by Judge Easterbrook: 
Rule 11 is designed to discourage unnecessary complaints and other 
filings, for the benefit of the judicial system as much as of the defendants. 
Unnecessary complaints sap the time of judges, forcing parties with 
substantial disputes to wait in a longer queue and condemning them to 
receive less judicial attention when their cases finally are heard. Rule 11 
fees may be awarded even against prevailing parties . . . . The violation 
of Rule 11 is complete when the paper is filed. 
Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Hudson v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 836 
2:04cv00925DAK. 
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F.2d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 1987) (The two problems that Rule 11 addresses, therefore, 
are 'frivolous filings' and the use of judicial procedures as a tool for 'harassment.'") 
(citation omitted)). 
Hence, when an offending party and counsel refuses to withdraw the offending 
pleading during the twenty-one day safe harbor - as in this case - sanctions for the 
abuse are warranted to vindicate the purposes of Rule 11. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE RULE 11 SANCTIONS AND AWARD UNITED 
PARK ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS BECAUSE STICHTING 
MAYFLOWERS' AMENDED COMPLAINT IS UNQUESTIONABLY 
FRIVOLOUS. 
1. Stichting Mayflowers Have Failed Inexplicably to Exhaust State 
Administrative and Judicial Remedies. 
In addition to sanctions being appropriate because this case was brought to 
harass, hinder and delay United Park and Park City, sanctions are warranted because 
the Complaint and Amended Complaint are unmistakably frivolous. Rule 11 provides in 
relevant part: 
By presenting to the court . . . a pleading . . . an attorney or party is 
certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, -
(2) the claims . . . therein are warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment 
of new l a w . . . . 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Whether sanctions are warranted under Rule 11(b)(2) for filing a 
frivolous pleading, is measured by an objective standard. Under controlling Tenth 
Circuit case law, to avoid sanctions for filing the Amended Complaint, Stichting 
Mayflowers must demonstrate that a "reasonable, competent attorney" would believe 
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the claim in the Amended Complaint has merit. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 
F.2d 675, 680 (10th Cir. 1990); accord Medical Supply Chain, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 
Case Nos. 04-3075 & 04-3102, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15320 (10th Cir. July 26, 2005) 
(reversing denial of Rule 11 sanctions for frivolous claims as an abuse of discretion) 
(see Attach. 3). 
Stichting Mayflowers' Amended Complaint is frivolous because it asks this Court 
to act as a board of review of decisions by the Park City Planning Commission before 
Stichting Mayflowers have made any effort to pursue their state administrative and 
judicial remedies.2 In the Amended Complaint, Stichting Mayflowers assert one cause 
of action, asking this Court to declare invalid a routine planning decision by the Park 
City Planning Commission of May 26, 2005, approving the Final Plat of Subdivision for 
the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side Subdivision (the "Subdivision Plat"), 
which is part of the Land Development Plan of United Park and East West Partners 
(Am. Compl. ^ 14), and which plaintiffs allege violates a Park City Ordinance, § 15-7.3-
4, and a Utah statute, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405(2). Am. Compl. fflj 4, 15-16. 
Stichting Mayflowers allegedly objected to that approval in the absence of Park City also 
granting or providing access for property that Stichting Mayflowers purportedly owned3 
- known as the Marsac Claim - which has historically been landlocked without access 
The Court will note that while representing these plaintiffs, Stichting Mayflowers5 counsel has previously 
been warned that his refusal to follow applicable rules could result in sanctions being imposed. See e.g., 
Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds v. Newpark Res., Inc., 9 Fed. Appx. 932, 935 n.3 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
3
 Notably, contrary to the bald factual misstatement of ownership in the Amended Complaint, it has not 
been determined that Stichting Mayflowers actually own the Marsac Claim. Such ownership is currently 
in dispute and being litigated. See Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mtn. Fonds, 2005 UT App. 279, 528 
Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (attached as Exhibit 1) (reversing district court ruling quieting title to Marsac Claim in 
Stichting Mayflowers). 
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to any public highway. Am. Compl. fl 14 & Ex. A. 
Utah statute expressly bars the declaratory relief for which Stichting Mayflowers 
pray in the Amended Complaint: 
No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under a regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative 
remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(1) (emphasis added); see also id. § 10-9a-801(2) 
(providing a "person adversely affected by a final decision" may obtain district 
court review) (emphasis added). Part 7 of § 801(1) statutorily requires that all 
municipalities provide for a procedure to appeal a land use decision, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 10-9a-701 to -708, and further mandates that an appeal to such 
administrative authority is "a condition precedent to judicial review." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9a-701(2). Park City has established an appeal authority, the Park 
City Board of Adjustment, to review land use decisions by the Park City Planning 
Commission. Park City Land Mgmt. Code § 5-10-1. 
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly, uniformly, and squarely held that when, 
like Stichting Mayflowers, a person "fails to exhaust their administrative remedies prior 
to filing suit, the suit must be dismissed." Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, |J 
16, 67P.3d466, 471. 
Where the legislature has imposed a specific exhaustion requirement such 
as that contained in section 10-9-1001 [the former counterpart to section 
10-9a-801], [courts] will enforce it strictly." IdL U 17. (emphasis added). 
The prohibition on review by a court absent exhaustion of administrative 
remedies applies equally even when couched as a "declaratory judgment" claim. jdL fl 
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19; see also Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dep't, 685 P.2d 550, 551 (Utah 1984) (per 
curiam) (holding that under county ordinances parallel to section 10-9a-801 "a party 
must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review"). 
Stichting Mayflowers simply ignored this plain jurisdictional requirement to 
obtaining judicial review of approval of the Subdivision Plat. Stichting Mayflowers never 
appealed the approval of the Subdivision Plat to the Board of Adjustment and they have 
failed to appeal any decision to state district court. Therefore, they have unquestionably 
failed to exhaust their state administrative and judicial remedies. Because the express 
statutory language requiring exhaustion is clear, and because the applicable case law 
uniformly holds that Stichting Mayflowers' Amended Complaint cannot be maintained, 
no reasonable and competent counsel would have filed the Amended Complaint. Rule 
11 sanctions should be imposed. 
2. Federal Case Law Supports Rule 11 Sanctions for Failure to Exhaust 
Administrative and Judicial Sanctions. 
Federal decisional case precedents have regularly held that a claim is frivolous 
and Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate when a party files a claim before exhausting 
state and federal administrative remedies. Mavity v. American Protectors Ins. Co., 
Case No. 92-15197, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 31074 (9th Cir. November 22, 1993) 
(affirming summary judgment dismissing ERISA claim for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies and imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, in part, for opposing the 
dismissal) (see Attach. 4); Fabian v. Cooper Indus., Inc., Case No. 91-76768, 1993 U.S. 
Dist Lexis 19788 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 1993) (see Attach. 5). Further, see Smith v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield, 724 F. Supp. 618, 622-23 (E.D. Wise. 1989), wherein the court 
dismissed state law claims as preempted by ERISA, and failure to exhaust 
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administrative remedies, and imposing Rule 11 sanctions for "patently frivolous" lawsuit. 
See also Sabo v. Dowd Toyota on the Heights, Inc., Case No. C87-3069, 1988 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6007 (N.D. Ohio May 31, 1988) (see Attach. 6). 
III. THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11 BECAUSE 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS FILED FOR THE IMPROPER PURPOSE 
OF CONTINUING STICHTING MAYFLOWERS' BAD FAITH HARASSMENT 
AND DELAY OF UNITED PARK. 
Stichting Mayflowers and their counsel are pursuing an intentional course of 
conduct to harass United Park, delay the development of United Park's property, and 
increase the cost of litigation which United Park must bear. In summary, United Park 
owns and, since 1994, has been attempting to develop large areas of land located in 
Summit and Wasatch Counties. Stichting Mayflowers and related entities also own land 
in Summit and Wasatch Counties but have undertaken virtually no effort or expense to 
seek or submit their own specific development applications or approvals. At virtually 
every step in the development approval process, Stichting Mayflowers have lodged 
unfounded objections that have directly injured United Park by delaying the 
development of its land as United Park is entitled. 
In Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, et al. v. The City of Park City, et al., 
Case No. 2:04cv00925, pending before the Honorable Dale A. Kimball, Stichting 
Mayflowers seek to nullify a 1999 Annexation by Park City and Development Agreement 
regarding land owned by United Park. Therein, Stichting Mayflowers has attempted to 
place this Court as a board of review of Park City's municipal planning and zoning 
decisions that turn exclusively on issues of municipal and state law.4 
4
 Following full briefing and oral argument, Judge Kimball currently has under advisement a Park City 
motion to dismiss, as meritless, said Stichting Mayflower Complaint. 
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This history of harassment exacerbates the seriousness of Stichting Mayflowers' 
breach of Rule 11 herein. This Court should sanction this frivolous conduct by imposing 
sanctions sufficient to send a message that further similar actions will not be tolerated. 
United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Durbano Const. Co., 144 F.R.D. 402,409 (D. Utah 1992) 
(Winder, J.). 
CONCLUSION 
As sanctions, the Court should dismiss the action without requiring an answer, 
impose a monetary sanction of not less than $50,000 on Stichting Mayflowers and their 
counsel, E. Craig Smay, and should award United Park its attorneys fees and costs: 
"Rule 11 sanctions are meant to serve several purposes, including (1) 
deterring future litigation abuse, (2) punishing present litigation abuse, (3) 
compensating victims of litigation abuse, and (4) streamlining court 
dockets and facilitating case management." 
White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684 (10th Cir. 1990). Among these, 
"deterrence is . . . the primary goal of the sanctions." Jd. (citing Cooter & Gel! v. 
HartmarxCorp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454, 110 L Ed. 2d 359 (1990)). 
DATED this ' T ^ ^ f d a y of August, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBE 
CLARK K. TAYLOR 
of and for 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Defendant 
United Park City Mines Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ifc^vL. day of August 2005, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF UNITED PARK CITY 
MINES CO. MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS & ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL FOR FRIVOLOUS 
COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT to be served upon the following, by 
mailing copies thereof by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
E. Craig Smay 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark D. Harrington 
Park City Attorney 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
445 Marsac Avenue 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, UT 84060-1480 
Mark R. Gaylord 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
E. Craig Smay #2985 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, Mayflower 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, Netherlands 
associations; 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, 
and 
EAST WEST PARTNERS, 
and 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO., 
A DELAWARE CORPORATION, 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
Civil No.: 2:05 CV 00525 TS/SA 
Honorable Ted Stewart 
Magistrate Judge: Samuel Alba 
Defendants. 
Defendant United Park City Mines Co.'s ("UPCM") remarkable Motion for Rule 
11 Sanctions essays the position that insofar as plaintiff could and (in UPCM's view) 
should have sued in State Court, the resort to a federal action under the diversity of 
citizenship provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) violates Rule 11, F.R.C.P. To be sure, 
UPCM adds a claim that plaintiff is in bad faith for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies by not appealing the underlying decision of the Park City Council to the Park 
City Board of Adjustment. This results, however, from UPCM's failure to read the Park 
City ordinance on which it purports to rely. The pertinent ordinance actually forbids such 
an appeal. 
This matter is subject to a Motion to Consolidate, filed August 23, 2005, with an 
earlier filed matter concerning the same land. Similar issues are raised on a Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the earlier matter, argued and pending decision by Judge Kimball. 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
The Complaint here contests a final plat approval part of a Master Planned 
Development ("MPD") under the Park City Land Management Code ("PCLMC"). 
Plaintiff appealed the matter to the Park City Council, noting, among other things, that 
the failure to provide access to plaintiffs adjoining property violated § 15-7-3.4 of the 
PCLMC. UPCM claims that plaintiffs should have appealed the decision of the City 
Council to the Park City Board of Adjustment, citing § 5-10-3, PCLMC. 
1 
There is no § 5-10-3 of the PCLMC. § 15-10-3 defines the jurisdiction of the 
Park City Board of Adjustment, as follows: 
15-10-3. POWERS AND DUTIES. 
(A) The Board of Adjustment shall hear and decide: 
(1) Appeals from zoning decisions applying Title 15, Land 
Management Code; 
(2) Special exceptions to the terms of the Land Management 
Code; and 
(3) Variances from the terms of the Land Management Code. 
(B) The Board of Adjustment shall make determinations regarding the 
modification of Non-Conforming uses and shall hear appeals on the 
determination of Non-Conforming or Non-Complying status by the 
Director of the Community Development Department, as provided in Title 
15, Chapter 9. 
The present action plainly does not fit into any specified category of Board of 
Adjustment jurisdiction. Moreover, § 15-10-3 provides: 
A Person may not appeal, and the Board of Adjustment may not consider, 
any amendments to the Land Management Code, or appeals of 
Conditional Use permits or Master Planned Developments which shall be 
appealed to the City Council. 
The present is plainly an appeal of a MPD which must be appealed only to the City 
Council. It does not involve a zoning decision, an exception to the PCLMC, or a 
variance from it. It does not involve a non-conforming use. 
Further, defendants have been made aware, on another occasion, that plaintiffs 
filing of an appeal to the Board of Adjustment of a similar, earlier City Council decision 
on the same MPD, was rejected by the City as outside the Board's jurisdiction. See 
Exhibit "A", attached. 
2 
Even under the unpublished opinions relied upon by UPCM, "reasonable inquiry 
would have led" UPCM to read the ordinance on which it purports to have relied, to 
discover that its exhaustion claim is wholly frivolous. Marity v. American Protectors Ins. 
Co., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31074 at 5 (9 Cir. 1993). 
UPCM also seems to claim that a State court action was an "administrative 
remedy" to be exhausted prior to a federal diversity action. Of course, a judicial 
proceeding is not an administrative remedy, and no federal action would lie following 
completion of a State action on the same cause. 
WHO OWNS THE MARSAC CLAIM? 
Plaintiffs are unquestionably the record title holder of the Marsac Claim. The 
Utah Court of Appeals' recent ruling that the District Court may entertain a further claim 
of exception to such title to the extent such claim is not res judicata, does not dilute 
plaintiffs' title, or lend substance to any such claim. All record title is subject to such 
claims. In any case, the Court of Appeals' recent ruling is subject to a pending 
reconsideration. See Exhibit "B". 
HARASSMENT 
In this matter, as in the related matter before Judge Kimball, UPCM has set up a 
plaintive cry of "harassment" against those who appear, in proceedings for final approval 
of subdivision plats, to point out violations of the local code, or who object to trespass 
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upon their land for construction of access roads for UPCM's development, or who seek 
the aid of courts (however successfully) for redress. UPCM also calls this "interference" 
with its "rights", but has yet to describe any such "right" but a preliminary approval 
which, even if it were legal, is subject by its terms to protests in proceedings for final 
approval The cry of "harassment" in this matter simply echoes UPCM's only defense in 
the matter before Judge Kimball. 
Arrogance, however, is not analysis. Pending its pardon from the ordinary 
burdens of citizenship, UPCM's automatic outrage at wholly unsubstantiated "bad faith 
harassment and delay" is not answer, but tantrum, not entitled to consideration. In any 
case, the claim of "harassment and delay" is pending decision on motion for summary 
judgment submitted for decision to Judge KimbalL A motion to consolidate the present 
matter with the earlier filed matter before Judge Kimball, is also pending. 
STATE LAW 
Because plaintiffs complain of a decision of Park City, requested by UPCM, 
regarding local land, defendants pretend that the issue is beyond the competence, or 
outside the jurisdiction of a federal court. No specific limitation on the jurisdiction of the 
court is cited. 
28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides federal courts jurisdiction of claims arising under state 
law, based upon diversity of the citizenship of the parties. This is true notwithstanding 
the subject matter is local land. Diversity jurisdiction is appropriate where all plaintiffs 
4 
are foreign entities and all defendants are American entities. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 
That is the present case. 
There is no reason to suppose that a State Court has any particular expertise or 
advantage in declaring the rights of the parties here, or that the parties are any less bound 
by a decree of a federal court in such a case. 
CONCLUSIONS 
UPCMTs Motion is without substance. The better argument is that the Motion, 
rather than the underlying Complaint, violates Rule 11, F.R.C.P. The Motion should be 
denied. 
Certainly, where the basis of the Motion - that plaintiff is engaged in a long-term 
program of "harassment and delay" of unspecified "rights" - may shortly be obviated by 
decision of a motion argued and submitted to Judge Kimball, and consolidation of the 
matters is pending, the Court should defer to Judge Kimball. 
DATED this 29th day of August, 2005. 
E. Craig Smay \ 
Attorney fqr Plaintiff 
MAYFINANCE C. V. 
Arie C. Bogerd 
P.O. Box 100 
4140ACLEERDAM 
Netherlands 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
"RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS " to be mailed this 29* day 
of August, 2005, to the following: 
Attorneys for Park City Municipal Corporation: 
Mark R. Gaylord (#5073) 
Craig H. Howe (#7522) 
Matthew L. Moncur (#9894) 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 S. Main St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221 
Telephone: (801) 531-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 3001 
Attorneys for United Park City Mines, Co.: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. (#0557) 
Clark K. Taylor (#5354) 
VANCOTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 S. Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsmilie: (801) 534-0058 
E. Craig Smay' \ 
) 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
CLARK K. TAYLOR (5354) 
STEPHEN K. CHRISTIANSENSEN (6512) 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058 
Attorneys for Defendant, United Park City 
Mines Company 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, Netherlands 
associations, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, 
And 
EAST WEST PARTNERS, 
And 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF RULE 11 MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS AGAINST STICHTING 
MAYFLOWERS PLAINTIFFS AND 
THEIR COUNSEL 
Oral Argument Requested 
Civil Number: 2:05CV00525 TS 
Honorable Ted Stewart 
United States District Judge 
United Park City Mines Co. ("United Park"), through its counsel of record, 
herewith submits this Reply Memorandum in support of Its Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions 
and Attorneys Fees and Costs against the plaintiffs and plaintiffs1 counsel for the filing of 
what clearly is a frivolous Amended Complaint and Complaint. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Response Memorandum of the Stichting Mayflower Plaintiffs ("Stichting 
Mayflowers") leaves no doubt that the Amended Complaint is frivolous (viewed under an 
objective standard) and that sanctions must be entered by this Court. 
The Stichting Mayflowers' Response is plain enough the intention is to turn 
this Court, in open violation of Federal case precedent, into a local municipal zoning and 
planning board of appeal to review fact specific allegations involving only the 
interpretation of Utah law. Specifically, the Amended Complaint seeks a declaratory 
judgment from this Court that a Park City Council zoning and planning decision as to 
Empire Village Pod (A), which did not provide specific acces to a neighboring 
landlocked property (the Marsac Claim), is invalid under Utah statutory law and Park 
City's municipal code. 
Not only does Stichting Mayflowers fail to cite a single authority to support this 
position, they ignore the overwhelming federal precedent that the federal courts were 
not established and will not sit as some sort of superior zoning and planning review 
board of local municipal zoning and planning decisions regardless of whether federal 
subject matter jurisdiction is based upon diversity, upon 28 U.S.C. § 1983, or otherwise. 
Neither do Stichting Mayflowers, or their counsel, advocate overturning the established 
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federal ruling case law. Rather, their Response is as though binding precedent does 
not even exist. 
In addition, Stichting Mayflowers do not even mention, much less address, the 
comprehensive structure of Utah statutory appeal procedure for real property zoning 
and development under the Municipal Land Use Development Act ("MLUDMA"), Utah 
Code Ann. 10-9-101 et seq, including specifically § 10-9a-801(2)(a), which expressly 
provides that a municipal zoning or planning decision must be filed in a Utah 
"district court" within 30 days after the local land use decision is final. (See 
Attachment 1.) Stichting Mayflowers' contention that because a federal district court 
may exercise diversity jurisdiction, the federal court may be substituted for a state 
district court is shorn of a single case precedent and is confronted by the "plain 
meaning" of what the Utah legislature intended under MLUDMA. 
Stichting Mayflowers' contention that it did not have to appeal the zoning and 
planning decision of the City Council of Park City to the Board of Adjustment is 
bottomed upon a Park City administrative letter focusing on a 1999 master plan 
agreement that is fundamentally inapposite to the zoning and planning decision of May 
26, 2005. 
Last, but not the least, Stichting Mayflowers and their counsel ask this Court to 
defer this Rule 11 Motion and grant their Motion to Consolidate this case with a case 
pending before U.S. District Judge Dale A. Kimball, Case No. 2:04cv00925. But Judge 
Kimball has already taken care of that case on August 29, 2005 by dismissing Stichting 
Mayflowers' complaint with prejudice against United Park and the Park City 
Commission. The point is that the Rule 11 violation herein occurred before this Court 
and it is this Court who should decide it and enter appropriate sanctions for the 
violation. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 has been violated in the extreme by Stichting 
Mayflowers and their counsel and sanctions should be entered. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IS FRIVOLOUS BECAUSE THE UTAH 
STATUTORY STRUCTURE FOR LAND ZONING, PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT APPEALS REQUIRES THAT A JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A 
MUNICIPAL LAND PLANNING AND ZONING DECISION BE BY THE STATE 
DISTRICT COURT WHEREIN THE PROPERTY IS SITUATED. 
The Utah Legislature has enacted a comprehensive, statutory scheme to be 
followed by property owners as well as by municipalities in the zoning, planning and 
development of real property in this State. MLUDMA lays out the specific zoning and 
planning powers of a municipality as well as the rights of a party in interest to contest or 
appeal a final decision of a municipality. Under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a) 
(2005) of MLUDMA, the Legislature provided that a final decision by a municipality must 
be filed in a Utah "district court": 
"Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of 
or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review 
of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the local land use 
decision is final." Id. (See Attachment 1). 
Under the "plain meaning" doctrine of the Utah Supreme Court, South Salt Lake 
v. Frederick, 925 P.2d 954, 957-58 (Utah 1994), it is clear that the Utah Legislature, by 
its reference to "the district court" in § 10-9a-801(2)(a) (2005), meant the state district 
court in which the real property is situated. Clearly no reasonable, competent attorney 
could argue, in good faith, that the phrase "the district court" was intended to mean a 
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federal district court sitting under diversity jurisdiction any more than it would be 
construed to mean a district court sitting in Colorado, Oklahoma or South Carolina. It is 
the Utah district courts that are familiar with the zoning, planning and development laws 
of the State of Utah as defined by statute and interpreted by the Utah appellate courts. 
Yet, that is the very argument which Stichting Mayflowers clings to, viz., that 
because there is diversity between the parties, Stichting Mayflowers can ignore the 
express state remedies provided the plaintiffs in the state district court for Summit 
County, Utah. The point will not be lost on this Court that Stichting Mayflowers makes 
such argument without even the hint of any precedent, case law or statutory, and in the 
face of federal case and authority against it. See authorities under Point II herein. Their 
contention hangs on the language of the Park City Land Management Code, § 15-10-3 
to the effect that a person aggrieved or affected by a decision of the City Board of 
Adjustment or the City Council may have "a plenary action for relief in any court of 
competent jurisdiction." It is plain under Utah law that § 15-1-18 of the Park City Code 
must be read in the context of the statutory enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
801(2)(a). In Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah Ct App. 1988), 
the Utah Court of Appeals held: 
"Where a route of review is provided by a state statute, a municipality 
lacks the power to alter that scheme." 
The Davis County court went on to hold that even if the Clearfield City ordinance were 
otherwise valid, an appeal must be made to "the district court". Id. (emphasis added). 
Even a cursory reading of the statute, § 10-9a-801(2)(a) and a few minutes of 
research would have reasonably indicated that the instant action was, in law, an appeal 
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from a final decision of the City Council of Park City and that the instant case, although 
labeled a declaratory judgment action rather than a petition for review, must be filed in 
the Utah district court wherein the property is situated. 
II. WELL ESTABLISHED FEDERAL PRECEDENT CONFIRMS ABSOLUTELY 
THAT THIS COURT IS NOT AN APPEAL BOARD OF REVIEW OF ZONING 
AND PLANNING DECISIONS OF A MUNICIPALITY IN UTAH. 
Virtually an avalanche of federal case precedent faces the claim of Stichting 
Mayflowers that this Court should sit to review, by way of a declaratory action, a Park 
City municipal zoning and planning decision for violation and interpreration of state law, 
particularly where there are no federal Constitutional issues raised. In Spence v. 
Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 262 (11th Cir. 1989), the 11th Circuit stated: 
"We stress that federal courts do not sit as zoning boards of review and 
should be most circumspect in determining that constitutional rights are 
violated in quarrels over zoning decisions." Raskiewicz v. Town of New 
Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) ("federal courts do not sit as a 
super zoning board or zoning board of appeals"); Albery v. Reddig, 718 
F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1983) (federal appeals court should not become 
accustomed to idea that constitutional rights are implicated in quarrel over 
zoning rules); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(noting reluctance of federal courts to sit as zoning boards of appeal). 
Id. Construction Industry Assoc, v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) 
("Being neither a super legislature nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal court is 
without authority to weigh and to reappraise the factors considered or ignored by the 
legislative body in passing the challenged zoning regulation.") cert, den., 424 U.S. 934 
(1976). 
In Coniston Corporation, et al v. Village of Hoffman Estates, et al, 844 F.2d 461, 
467 (7th Cir. 1988), Judge Posner (with Judge Easterbrook concurring) held for the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals: 
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"This case presents a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the 
trappings of constitutional law. . . . If the plaintiffs can get us to review the 
merits of the Board of Trustees' decision under state law, we cannot 
imagine what zoning dispute could not be shoehorned into federal court in 
this way, . . . . Something more is necessary than dissatisfaction with the 
rejection of a site plan to turn a zoning case into a federal case; and it 
should go without saving that the something more cannot be merely a 
violation of state (or local) law. A violation of state law is not a denial of 
due process of law (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Id. at 467. 
The First Circuit in Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 (1st Cir. 
1982) held under a parallel set of facts to this case: 
"But the ordinary state administrative proceeding involving land use or 
zoning does not present such a situation [involving 'recognized federal 
constitutional rights'] regardless of how disappointed the license or 
privilege seeker may feel at being initially turned down. Thus, where-as-
here the state has erected a complex statutory scheme and provided for 
avenues of appeal to the state courts, property is not denied without due 
process simply because a local planning board rejects a proposed 
development for erroneous reasons or makes demands which argueably 
exceed its authority under relevant state statutes." Id. at 832. 
In Norton, et al v. Village of Corrales, 103 F.3d 928, 932, 933 (10th Cir. 1996) the 
Tenth Circuit stated, in a case wherein there was an attempted federal appeal from a 
planning and zoning commission decision of the Village of Corrales, declared: 
"Actions that violate state law are properly challenged in state courts . . . 
'the legality of a zoning decision under applicable state law is not 
determinative of whether the decision violated federal substantive law\ 
Sylvia Development Corp. v. Calvart County, 48 F.3d 810, 829 (4th Cir. 
1995). . . . See E. G. Gunkel v. City of Emporia, 835 F.2d 1302, 1304 
(10th Cir. 1987) (federal courts do not sit as fal 'zoning board of appeals' to 
resolve municipal zoning disputes]. . . . " 
Id. at 932, 933 (emphasis added) (brackets in original). 
This ruling case law cannot be ignored by Stichting Mayflowers and its counsel. 
No argument has been advanced that said case law is unwarranted or that a new rule of 
law adopted holding that federal courts should be a board of review to hear local, 
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municipal zoning and planning decisions, has been made by the Plaintiffs. No 
reasonable competent attorney could have brought the Amended Complaint herein 
without having first reviewed and analyzed this controlling federal case precedent 
The fact that this action was filed by Plaintiffs in contradiction of that precedent or without 
contending in good faith that it should be overturned, is, under the extant facts, 
sanctionable under Rule 11. This Court's valuable judicial resources and the costs and 
expenses of the Defendants to defend this frivolous Amended Complaint have been 
substantial. United Park's Rule 11 Motion should be granted. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' ARE IN ERROR IN CONTENDING THAT A PRIOR DECISION OF 
THE CITY COUNCIL OF PARK CITY REGARDING THE ENFORCEMENT OF A 
1999 MASTER PLAN DEVELOPMENT RAISES THE SAME ISSUE AS THAT IN 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
Stichting Mayflowers claim that it had no remedy to exhaust by way of an appeal 
to the Park City Board of Adjustment from the May 26, 2005 decision of the Park City 
Council, citing as authority an earlier letter of the Park City Planning Director rejecting 
Stichting Mayflowers' October 1, 2004 letter of appeal regarding a Park City Council 
decision of September 23, 2004. But that letter and issue involved a 1999 master plan 
agreement, fundamentally different than this case. The Amended Complaint does not 
attempt to raise the validity or enforceability of the 1999 Agreement, but rather planning 
approval of the Empire Village (Pod A) assuming that the zoning was valid. See the 
development zoning described in fflj 4, 7, 16 of Amended Complaint. Thus, the 
reference to the October 4, 2004 letter from the Park City Planning Director to Stichting 
Mayflowers1 counsel is inapposite and irrelevant. 
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IV. PLAINTIFFS' SUGGESTION THAT THIS COURT REFER THIS RULE 11 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS TO JUDGE KIMBALL PURSUANT TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE, IS EQUALLY FLAWED BECAUSE 
JUDGE KIMBALL HAS DISMISSED THE CASE TO WHICH PLAINTIFFS 
SEEK CONSOLIDATION. 
United Park has already addressed the question of whether Judge Stewart 
should grant Stichting Mayflowers1 Motion to Consolidate its Amended Complaint with a 
prior case of Stichting Mayflowers assigned to the Honorable Dale A. Kimball, U.S. 
District Judge. Case No. 2:04cv00925. The uncontroverted fact is that Judge Kimball 
the same day, August 29, 2005, that Stichting Mayflowers filed its Response to this Rule 
11 Motion, entered an Order of Dismissal With Prejudice against Stichting Mayflowers 
and in favor of Park City Municipal Corporation and United Park. Consequently, the 
suggestion to defer this Motion must be denied on that basis, alone. 
But there is even a more significant principle involved. Stichting Mayflowers and 
its counsel cannot escape the fact that its Rule 11 violation occurred in this Court and 
they cannot escape that culpability by arguing that a Motion to Consolidate, filed long 
after the Amended Complaint was filed herein and in the face of United Park's Rule 11 
Motion for Sanctions and Attorneys Fees, should somehow control the disposition by 
this Court of the Rule 11 Motion. As Judge Easterbrook wrote in Szabo Food Service, 
Inc. v. Canteen Corp.. 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1987), "the violation of Rule 11 is 
complete when the paper is filed." That violation occurred in Judge Stewart's Court. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The Amended Complaint and Complaint are frivolous. It is respectfully submitted 
the Rule 11 sanctions should be entered which includes the Amended Complaint being 
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stricken, a sanctions entered in the Court's discretion of not less than $50,000 and for 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs to United Park. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 12th day of September, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL 
CLARK K. TAYLOR 
STEPHEN K. CHRISTIANSEN 
of and for 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Defendant 
United Park City Mines Company 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL (0557) 
CLARK K. TAYLOR (5354) 
STEPHEN K. CHRISTIANSENSEN (6512) 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058 
Attorneys for Defendant, United Park City 
Mines Company 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, Netherlands 
associations, 
Plaintiffs, 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, 
and 
EAST WEST PARTNERS, 
and 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO.'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
PLAINTIFFS' FRIVOLOUS AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil Number: 2.05CV00525 TS 
Honorable Ted Stewart 
United States District Judge 
The Defendant, United Park City Mines Co. ("United Park"), through its counsel 
of record, herewith submits its Supporting Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion 
to Dismiss Stichting Mayflowers Mountain Fonds' and Stichting Mayflower Recreational 
Fonds' ("Stichting Mayflowers") Frivolous Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
RELEVANT PLEADED FACTS OF PLAINTIFFS5 AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Only for the purpose of United Park's Motion to Dismiss, the following relevant 
pleaded facts are admitted: 
• On May 25, 2005, the Park City Planning Commission, over Stichting 
Mayflowers' objection, approved United Park's subdivision and development 
known as the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side (Am. Compl. ^ 13); 
• On May 26, 2005, the City Council of Park City, over Stichting Mayflowers' 
objection, approved United Park's Village at Empire Pass (Pod A), allegedly 
resulting in the Marsac Claim (as to which Stichting Mayflowers contend they 
may have some interest) being inaccessible and undevelopable (Am. Compl. 
1114); 
• That the Park City Land Management Code provides that streets are to be 
extended to boundaries of developed property unless prevented by 
topography or other physical conditions, or unless the Park City Planning 
Commission determines in its discretion that such extension is not necessary 
(Am. Compl. 1J15). 
By way of a legal and factual conclusion, the Amended Complaint then 
alleges that the failure of the Park City Council to enforce PCLMC § 15-7.3-4 the May 
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26, 2005 decision of the City Council of Park City discriminates against Stichting 
Ivlayflowers in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405(2) (Am. Compl. fl 16, prayer). 
A R G U M E N T 
I. THE RELEVANT PLEADED FACTS ALLEGE ONLY THAT A PARK CITY 
MUNICIPAL PLANNING AND ZONING DECISION VIOLATES A UTAH 
STATUTORY LAND DEVELOPMENT PROVISION AND AN ASPECT OF 
PARK CITY'S MUNICIPAL PLANNING CODE, 
The Amended Complaint herein can be simply put - - it is a municipal planning 
and zoning appeal, disguised under the label of a declaratory judgment action, of a local 
Park City planning and zoning decision of May 26, 2005. The basis is that it is allegedly 
discriminatory in violation of a State statute and allegedly inconsistent with Park City's 
Land Management Code. No federal constitutional or statutory question is alleged. 
To begin with, the Park City Land Management Code, which the Amended 
Complaint raises, is unexceptional. Section 15-7.3-4 states that streets within a 
subdivided property shall extend to the boundary line: 
"unless prevented by topography or other physical conditions, or unless in 
the opinion of the Planning Commission such an extension is not 
necessary . . . " 
PCLMC § 15-7.3-4. Thus the Park City Code sets forth a rule of land development with 
discretion in the planning commission, as reviewed by the Park City Council, not to 
follow the rule if believed unnecessary to coordinate a subdivision development with 
neighboring property. No allegation is made in the Amended Complaint that the City 
Council (or for that matter the Planning Commission) abused its discretion or acted 
arbitrarily or unreasonably in the approval of United Park's Village at Empire Pass (Pod 
A) West Side. 
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Secondly, the Utah state statute, § 10-9-405(2), alleged to be violated as 
discriminatory by the May 26, 2005 City Council planning and zoning decision, is both 
unredeeming and innocuous: 
"10-9-405. Zoning district 
(2) The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for 
each class or kind of buildings throughout each district but the regulations 
in one district may differ from those in other districts." 
Id. (emphasis added). Whether § 10-9-405(2) relating to "buildings" has any 
application to this case involving approval of undeveloped land is a matter for the 
interstitial interpretation and construction of the Utah Land Planning and Zoning statute. 
But one conclusion is unmistakable, viz., § 10-9-405(2) is merely a part of the larger 
Utah Municipal Land Use Development Management Act ("MLUDMA"), which is the 
Utah Legislature's comprehensive statutory land planning and zoning law. The 
Legislature has plainly provided that if a municipal land planning or zoning decision is 
alleged to violate any part of MLUDMA, including § 10-9-405(2), a petition for review 
may be taken from such a decision within 30 days thereof to a district court. Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a), part of MLUDMA, mandates that such petition for review must 
be filed in a Utah district court: 
"Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of 
or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review 
of the decision with the district court within 30 after the local land use 
decision is final." 
]d. (emphasis added). Thus, even if the factual allegations of Stichting Mayflowers' 
Amended Complaint are assumed to be true and the quasi-factual and -legal 
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conclusions were correct (which they are not), Stichting Mayflowers' remedy for an 
appeal is a petition for review to be filed in the state district court for Summit County as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a) of MLUDMA. 
II. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DIVERSITY JURISDICTION EXISTS, 
OVERWHELMING FEDERAL CASE PRECEDENT IS ABSOLUTELY 
CLEAR THAT FEDERAL COURTS WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO 
SITTING AS A LOCAL PLANNING & ZONING BOARD OF APPEAL TO 
REVIEW A MUNICIPAL PLANNING & ZONING DECISION WHICH 
ALLEGEDLY VIOLATES STATE LAW. 
1- Utah Substantive Law is Applicable in This Diversity Case. 
It has been established law for over 200 years in this Country that a federal court, 
in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction, will apply the statutory law of the state in which it 
sits. The Judiciary Act of 1789, now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1652, makes the application 
of state law obligatory in a federal diversity case. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1841). Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), laid down the principle that state case 
law precedent is also applicable in a diversity case. 
Thus, it can not be gainsaid that Utah substantive law, statutory and case 
precedent, is applicable to Stichting Mayflowers' amended complaint. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-801(2)(a) Dictates That The Stichting 
Mayflowers' Remedy For the Claim Set Out In Its Amended Complaint is 
in Utah State District Court, 
The Utah MLUDMA is a comprehensive set of statutes of the Utah Legislature to 
deal with municipal land planning and zoning. An integral part of MLUDMA is § 10-9a-
801(2)(a) providing that a party aggrieved by a municipal planning or zoning decision 
shall have a remedy by a "petition for review" filed "with the district court" within 30 days 
of the final municipal decision. See Attachment 3. 
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Under the "plain meaning" doctrine of the Utah Supreme Court in South Salt 
Lake v. Frederick, 925 P.2d 954, 957-58 (Utah 1994), it is clear that the Utah 
Legislature, by its reference to "the district court" in § 10-9a-801(2)(a), meant the Utah 
district court in which the real property was situated. No other reasonable or good faith 
construction of the statute is possible. 
The argument of Stichting Mayflowers that they are somehow entitled to 
substitute this Court for a Utah state district court because of diversity jurisdiction and 
that a federal court is just as knowledgeable about Utah law of planning and zoning as a 
state court, simply will not wash. It would do violence to "plain meaning" to suggest that 
the Utah Legislature, by its direction that a "petition for review" should be made to "the 
district court" intended it to mean a federal district court or, for that matter a district court 
in Colorado, Idaho, or South Carolina. Moreover, it is the Utah state district courts, not 
federal or some other district court, that is familiar with the statutory land planning and 
zoning structure of MLUDMA and § 10-9-405(2) which Stitching Mayflowers claims was 
violated by the Park City Council's municipal decision of May 26, 2005. Creative 
Environments Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 (1 s t Cir. 1982). 
Under the applicable controlling law, Stitching Mayflowers' amended complaint 
belongs, if anywhere, in the state district court for Summit County, not in this Court. 
3. Federal Case Law is Unequivocal That A Federal District Court Will Not 
Sit As A Local Municipal Board of Appeal to Review Planning and 
Zoning Decisions of a Municipality, 
A mountain of federal case precedent faces Stichting Mayflowers' claim that this 
Court should now sit to review, under the guise of a declaratory action, a Park City 
municipal zoning and planning decision for its alleged violation of a state planning and 
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zoning statute, particularly where there are no federal constitutional issues raised. The 
First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F. 2d 256, 262 (11 t h Cir. 
1989), rejected such a claim and declaring unequivocally that federal courts do not sit 
as municipal zoning boards of appeal: 
"We stress that federal courts do not sit as zoning boards of review and 
should be most circumspect in determining that constitutional rights are 
violated in quarrels over zoning decisions." Raskiewicz v. Town of New 
Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) ("federal courts do not sit as a 
super zoning board or zoning board of appeals"); Albery v. Reddig, 718 
F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1983) (federal appeals court should not become 
accustomed to idea that constitutional rights are implicated in quarrel over 
zoning rules); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(noting reluctance of federal courts to sit as zoning boards of appeal). 
873 F.2d at 262. The Ninth Circuit, in Construction Industry Assoc, v. City of Petaluma, 
522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) reached the same conclusion: 
"Being neither a super legislature nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal 
court is without authority to weigh and to reappraise the factors considered 
or ignored by the legislative body in passing the challenged zoning 
regulation.") cert, den., 424 U.S. 934 (1976)." 
Judge Posner (with Judge Easterbrook concurring) candidly stated the succinct 
proposition in Coniston Corporation v. Village of Hoffman Estates, et al., 844 F.2d 461, 
467 (7th Cir. 1988), that the federal courts simply were not going to be a repository "to 
shoehorn" appeals from local municipal planning and zoning decisions where there are 
no federal questions presented, even though federal subject matter jurisdiction might be 
present: 
"This case presents a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the 
trappings of constitutional law. . . . If the plaintiffs can get us to review the 
merits of the Board of Trustees1 decision under state law, we cannot 
imagine what zoning dispute could not be shoehorned into federal court in 
this way, . . . . Something more is necessary than dissatisfaction with the 
rejection of a site plan to turn a zoning case into a federal case; and it 
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should go without saving that the something more cannot be merely a 
violation of state (or local) law. A violation of state law is not a denial of 
due process of law (citations omitted) (emphasis added). kiL at 467. 
The First Circuit in Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 
(1st Cir. 1982), held that federal courts do not sit to review local planning board 
decisions where there is a complex state statutory structure in place and there is a 
remedy for judicial review under the state statute: 
"But the ordinary state administrative proceeding involving land use or 
zoning does not present such a situation [involving 'recognized federal 
constitutional rights1] regardless of how disappointed the license or 
privilege seeker may feel at being initially turned down. Thus, where-as-
here the state has erected a complex statutory scheme and provided for 
avenues of appeal to the state courts, property is not denied without due 
process simply because a local planning board rejects a proposed 
development for erroneous reasons or makes demands which argueablv 
exceed its authority under relevant state statutes." |d. at 832 (emphasis 
added). 
Finally, the controlling precedent of the Tenth Circuit holds to the same principle. 
In Norton et al v. Village of Corrales, 103 F.3d 928, 932-33 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth 
Circuit stated in a case where there was an attempted federal appeal from a planning 
and zoning commission decision of the Village of Corrales: 
"Actions that violate state law are properly challenged in state courts . . . 
'the legality of a zoning decision under applicable state law is not 
determinative of whether the decision violated federal substantive law'. 
Sylvia Development Corp. v. Calvart County, 48 F.3d 810, 829 (4th Cir. 
1995). . . . See E. G. Gunkel v. City of Emporia, 835 F.2d 1302, 1304 
(10th Cir. 1987) (federal courts do not sit as fa] 'zoning board of appeals' to 
resolve municipal zoning disputes]. . . ." 
id. at 932-33 (emphasis added) (brackets in original). 
This black letter law has been ignored by Stichting Mayflowers in the filing of their 
Amended Complaint. No party can ignore this controlling law without violating the 
6 
provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. A dismissal of the Amended 
Complaint should be forthwith granted. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
For the reasons set forth in the Motion to Dismiss and this Memorandum, the 
Amended Complaint of Stichting Mayflowers should be dismissed with prejudice, as a 
matter of law. 
DATED this / / day of October, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL 
CLARK K. TAYLOR 
STEPHEN K. CHRISTIANSEN 
of and for 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Defendant 
United Park City Mines Company 
G&ncMuJJ ^  
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I hereby certify that on the / / day of October, 2005, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO.'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS3 FRIVOLOUS AMENDED 
COMPLAINT to be served upon the following as follows: 
BY HAND DELIVERY AND FACSIMILE: 
E. Craig Smay 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BY FIRST CLASS U.S. MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID: 
Mark D. Harrington 
Park City Attorney 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
445 Marsac Avenue 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, UT 84060-1480 
Mark R. Gaylord 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
E. Craig Smay #2985 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, Mayflower 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, Netherlands 
associations; 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, 
and 
EAST WEST PARTNERS, 
and 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO., 
A DELAWARE CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
OPPOSITION TO UPCM'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No.: 2:05 CV 00525 TS/SA 
Honorable Ted Stewart 
Magistrate Judge: Samuel Alba 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Plaintiffs respond herewith to Defendant, United Park City Mines Company's 
("UPCM's") "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Frivolous Amended Complaint." The 
Motion is not simply without substance or merit, it is knowingly without substance or 
merit. 
UPCM has made a similar motion previously, denominating it one seeking Rule 
11 Sanctions, supported by a similar memorandum. 
In response, plaintiffs then pointed out that defendant's sneering claim that 
plaintiffs had failed to exhaust state administrative remedies was the result of defendant's 
failure to read the applicable ordinance. The applicable ordinance actually forbids the 
"exhaustion of remedies" demanded by UPCM. 
UPCM has now deleted the part of its motion demanding exhaustion of remedies. 
In doing so, it apparently overlooks what this admits about the remainder of its position. 
This is discussed below. 
Plaintiffs also then pointed out that the cases UPCM arrogantly cited for the 
proposition that "Federal case law is unequivocal that a federal district court will not sit 
as a local municipal board of appeal to review planning and zoning decisions of a 
municipality" simply demonstrates the difficulty in a municipal planning proceeding, of 
making a federal constitutional or civil rights claim conferring federal question 
jurisdiction on a federal court. These cases have nothing to do with diversity jurisdiction, 
under which the present case is brought, nor do they say that federal question jurisdiction 
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can never be shown in such cases. Some of the cases cited by UPCM in fact proceed to a 
decision on the merits on federal question jurisdiction. Construction Ind. Assoc, v. City 
of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9 Cir. 1975); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 
844 F.2d 461 (7 Cir. 1988). So much for the claim that federal courts never proceed in 
such cases. 
FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION (28 U.S.C. § 1331) / DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION (28 U.S.C. § 1332) 
The basic rule of the cases cited by UPCM is stated plainly in the Tenth Circuit's 
ruling in Norton v. Village ofCorrales, 103 F.3d 928, 930 (10 Cir. 1996): 
. . .when an attack on the validity of a city ordinance "is limited to the 
claim that the ordinance violates the state law[ ] Federal Courts do not 
review such a claim under the jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
[federal question] and the result of error in the administration of state law, 
though injury may result, is not a matter of federal judicial cognizance 
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." 
At the same time, where the claim in such a case includes discriminatory or 
partisan treatment by the municipal authority, a federal claim may well be stated: 
A different situation may be presented in some instances, particularly in 
the realm of equal protection, involving gross abuse of power, invidious 
discrimination, or fundamentally unfair procedures. 
Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 n. 9 (1 Cir. 1982). Accord, 
Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 261 (11 Cir. 1989); Coniston Corp. v. Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7 Cir. 1988); Norton v. Village ofCorralesf supra, 
103F.3dat932. 
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The difficulty for plaintiffs in these cases arises where only federal question 
jurisdiction is invoked and the municipal authority's behavior is alleged to violate only 
state law, not also a federal law or constitutional right. 
The Complaint in this case asserts that, in a Park City "Master Planned 
Development" ("MPD") proceeding involving similar lands of plaintiffs and UPCM 
located in the same development zone, Park City treated plaintiffs' lands discriminatorily. 
An earlier discrimination respecting the same property in the same MPD 
proceeding is alleged in a matter pending before Judge Kimball. In that phase of the 
proceeding, Park City determined that only UPCM, as an owner in the development zone 
containing plaintiffs' and UPCM's land, could actually develop its land, and plaintiffs 
could not. To be allowed to develop, plaintiffs would require a re-zoning of their land, 
though UPCM would not. See Exhibit "A" hereto (Staff Report 07/14/04), 
In the present phase of the same proceedings, respecting the same lands in the 
same zone, Park City declines to enforce its ordinance requiring that streets approved for 
development of UPCM's land be extended to the boundary of plaintiffs' land. 
Apparently, this decision incorporates and enforces the earlier one that plaintiffs' land, 
though zoned identically with UPCM's land, cannot be developed as UPCM's land can. 
Park City's behavior violates § 10-9-405(2), U.C.A. (1953), on its face: 
The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for each 
class or kind of buildings throughout each district. 
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Regulation must be uniform and non-discriminatory for whatever uses are permitted 
within each zone.l This requirement mirrors the due process and equal protection 
requirements of both State and federal constitutional law. The discrimination which 
occurred in the present case could be challenged under the statute, the State Constitution, 
the federal Constitution, or any combination thereof. A motion to dismiss will not be 
granted unless it is plain plaintiffs could prove no claim on any of these bases. Bryson v. 
Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10 Cir. 1990). 
CHOICE OF FORUM 
UPCM now concedes that there is such a thing as diversity jurisdiction. It 
concedes that causes of action created by state statute may be pursued in a federal court, 
notwithstanding no "federal question" is raised. UPCM apparently believes that the State 
Legislature is unaware of this principle, since it argues that insofar as the statute in issue 
indicates what division of the state courts has jurisdiction, it cancels the federal statute on 
diversity jurisdiction. It does not affect federal diversity jurisdiction that the legislature 
provides that review of land use decisions is not an original proceeding in a court of 
appeals, or will lie in a district court notwithstanding the monetary amount at stake is 
small. 
UPCM's insinuation that the statute deals with uniformity of "buildings" rather than uniformity of 
regulation is too thoughtless to require response. 
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There are many state statutes designating which claims should be filed in which 
divisions of the state court system, usually on the basis of subject matter or amount in 
controversy. Such statutes do not cancel diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts. 
While § 10-9a-801(2)(a) provides that one abused by a municipal land use 
decision may seek review in "the district court", the term is not limited to, or elsewhere 
defined as, the state district court.2 Further, of course, the statute does not, and could not, 
affect federal jurisdiction where the violation alleged affects federally protected rights of 
due process and equal protection. 
The "plain meaning" doctrine of South Salt Lake v. Frederick, 925 P.2d 954, 957-
58 (Utah 1994), does not affect this, simply because there is no language in the statute 
which limits the phrase "district court5 to State district court. Nor does the in terrorem 
argument that such claims might be brought in "a district court in Colorado, Idaho, or 
South Carolina", insofar as venue in such courts would be improper, and such courts 
would not have in rem jurisdiction. 
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES 
UPCM had deleted from the present motion the demand of its prior motion that 
plaintiffs' exhaust state remedies by applying for relief to the Park City Board of 
Adjustment. It does so because the pertinent Park City ordinance specifies that "appeals 
2
 The implementing Park City code provision refers simply to a "court of competent jurisdiction". 
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of. . . Master Planned Developments . . . shall be appealed to the City Council", a fact 
pointed out to plaintiffs by Park City in an earlier phase of the subject MPD proceeding. 
UPCM's behavior in this respect acknowledges what ought to have been 
acknowledged in proceedings to consolidate this matter with that pending before Judge 
Kimball: that the present proceeding involves the same land, the same parties, the same 
zoning designation, all part of the same MPD proceeding in Park City, and connected 
issues of law and fact. 
FRIVOLITY 
Oddly, in support of what it now calls a "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Frivolous 
Amended Complaint'', UPCM has neglected to assert that the Complaint is in any degree 
frivolous. It does not deny that Park City, at the behest of UPCM, did what it is alleged 
to have done, or that such behavior is disallowed by Park City's own code, state statute, 
or State and federal constitutions, or even that the treatment accorded plaintiffs was 
overtly discriminatory. Proof of these matters will establish a clear and appropriate claim 
against defendants under both State and federal law. UPCM simply says that it thinks the 
claims were better filed in a State court. It offers no serious support for that claim. 
The latter claim demonstrates neither frivolity, nor violation of Rule 11, F.R.C.P., 
nor a ground for dismissal. Following the response to its earlier Motion, UPCM knew all 
of the foregoing. It knew that it had no honest basis, nor proper purpose, for renewing 
the motion in other guise. It presumes that the mere cry of "frivolous lawsuit" pushes a 
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demagogic hot button that prevents analysis or fair hearing. Apparently, it believes that 
Rule 11 is a trick to be exploited for partisan advantage. 
The Court should firmly deny UPCM's Motion and remind it of its obligations 
under Rule 11. 
4 th DATED this 4m day of November, 2005. 
/ / 
E/Craig Smay 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
"OPPOSITION TO UPCM'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED 
COMPLAINT " to be mailed this 4th day of November, 2005, to the following: 
Attorneys for Park City Municipal Corporation: 
Mark R. Gaylord (#5073) 
Craig H. Howe (#7522) 
Matthew L. Moncur (#9894) 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 S. Main St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221 
Telephone: (801) 531-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 3001 
Attorneys for United Park City Mines, Co.: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. (#0557) 
Clark K. Taylor (#5354) 
VANCOTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 S. Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsmilie: (801) 534-0058 
E. Craig Smay 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
CLARK K. TAYLOR (5354) 
STEPHEN K. CHRISTIANSENSEN (6512) 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058 
Attorneys for Defendant, United Park City 
Mines Company 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, Netherlands 
associations, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, 
And 
EAST WEST PARTNERS, 
And 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO.'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO 
STICHTING MAYFLOWERS' 
OPPOSITION TO UNITED PARK'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FRIVOLOUS 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
Civil Number: 2.05CV00525 TS 
Honorable Ted Stewart 
United States District Judge 
United Park City Mines Company ("United Park"), through its counsel of record, 
herewith submits this Reply Memorandum of Law to the Opposition Memorandum of 
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds 
("Stichting Mayflowers") to United Park's October 17, 2005 Motion to Dismiss Stichting 
Mayflowers' frivolous Amended Complaint. 
S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T 
Stichting Mayflowers' Opposition removes any doubt that this Court should 
dismiss their Amended Complaint as frivolous. 
To begin with, Stichting Mayflowers berate United Park for not agreeing to, and 
then indirectly chastise this Court for denying, Stichting Mayflowers' motion to 
consolidate this case with a case before Judge Kimball (Opp. Memo. @ 6). Stichting 
Mayflowers then make the remarkable argument that the Utah statute § 10-9a-801(2)(a) 
"could not affect federal jurisdiction where the violation alleged affects federally 
protected rights of due process and equal protection" (Opp. Memo. @ 5), The riveting 
fact is that Stichting Mayflowers have never alleged in any way in this case that the Park 
City zoning and planning decision of May 26, 2005 "affected federally protected rights of 
due process and egual protection". Yet, Stichting Mayflowers' Opposition Memorandum 
repeatedly attempts to falsely inject such argument throughout their Opposition as 
though they had raised federal constitutional rights. See Opp. Memo, p. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 
Secondly, Stichting Mayflowers have conspicuously failed to cite a single case or 
other authority holding that a federal district court is required, in either a federal question 
or diversity case, to sit as a municipal board of appeal to review a local zoning and 
planning decision and dispute. In so doing, Stichting Mayflowers have ignored 
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addressing, much less discussing, the underlying rationale of the case authorities and 
quotations cited by United Park in its Motion to Dismiss. Notably, they fail to make a 
good faith argument that such controlling and persuasive authority should be overturned 
and a new rule adopted (as they are required to do under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11). 
Thirdly, stripped of the cynical and ad hominem attacks, the remnants of 
Stichting Mayflowers' claim is simply stated - viz., even though Park City Council's May 
26, 2005 zoning and planning decision is alleged to violate a Utah building uniformity 
statute under the Utah Municipal Land Use Management Act ("MLUDMA"), § 10-9-
405(2), and even though that Act provides a statutory appeal before a Utah district court 
under § 10-9a-801(2)(a), this Court must, nonetheless, sit as a zoning and planning 
appeal board to review such decision and every other municipal planning and zoning 
decision that Stichting Mayflowers may attempt to bring this Court's way, just because 
Stichting Mayflowers are Dutch citizens. The argument is a dead letter. Overwhelming 
authority holds that a federal court, whether exercising federal subject matter or 
diversity jurisdiction, will not become a super zoning and planning review board for the 
appeal of local, municipal planning and zoning decisions. See authority and discussion 
below. 
Lastly, Stichting Mayflowers argue in their Opposition that while United Park has 
moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint as frivolous, "United Park has neglected to 
assert" that such Complaint is "in any degree frivolous". (Opp. Memo. @ 6.) That 
statement suggests that Stichting Mayflowers' counsel has not read the United Park 
Motion and Memorandum. In its Motion to Dismiss at U 7, United Park specifically sets 
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forth that the Amended Complaint is frivolous, filed contrary to Rule 11, and should be 
dismissed. Further, in United Park's Memorandum at the bottom of p. 6-7, it is urged 
that: 
"This black letter law has been ignored by Stichting Mayflowers in the filing 
of their Amended Complaint. No party can ignore this controlling law 
without violating the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. A 
dismissal. . . should be forthwith granted." 
A R G U M E N T 
I. STICHTING MAYFLOWERS IGNORE AND FAIL TO EVEN MENTION 
CONTROLLING AND PERSUASIVE PRECEDENT THAT REGARDLESS OF 
WHETHER A FEDERAL COURT SITS IN A FEDERAL QUESTION OR 
DIVERSITY CASE, FEDERAL COURTS WILL NOT MEDDLE IN LOCAL 
MUNICIPAL ZONING DISPUTES AND BECOME APPEAL REVIEW BOARDS 
OF LOCAL, MUNICIPAL PLANNING AND ZONING DECISIONS MADE 
UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE STATE LAW. 
There is substantial and persuasive precedent which was ignored and uncited by 
Stichting Mayflowers that unravels their Amended Complaint. In Ad+Soil Services, Inc. 
v. Bd. Of County Commissioners of Queen Anne's County, 596 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (D. 
Md. 1984), the plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action against Queen Anne's 
Board of County Commissioners contenting that certain zoning actions affecting Ad+ 
Soil violated the plaintiffs' rights. Jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship. 
Facing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the issues were required to be 
addressed in a Maryland state court because of local, zoning policy matters, Ad+Soil 
contended that diversity jurisdiction entitled it to have local zoning matters heard before 
the federal district court. That court quickly rejected the argument, stating: 
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Plaintiff, however, argues that because Ad+Soil has invoked this court's 
diversity jurisdiction, they are entitled to have their state law issues 
concerning the validity of the zoning amendments decided in this Court... 
Even though diversity jurisdiction exists, the same considerations of 
comity and avoiding federal intervention into local land use policies still 
apply. See, Smith v. Metropolitan Property, 629 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(where it was held that abstention was appropriate despite existence of 
diversity jurisdiction, since federal court should not intervene in state 
policies concerning a comprehensive insurance regulation scheme.) 
Id. at 1141. The district court, in Ad+Soil, dismissed the action concluding that 
abstention was proper "to avoid needless state-federal friction caused by federal 
interference through the administration by the state of its own purely local affairs. Id. at 
1141. 
The Ad+Soil decision is consistent with other federal decisions concluding that 
whether jurisdiction is based upon diversity or federal question, a federal district court 
will not allow itself to be used as an appeal board to review disputes involving local, 
municipal land, zoning decisions. In Fourth Quarter Properties IV, Inc., v. City of 
Concord, 2000 WL 231303 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (annexed as Attachment 1 hereto), Fourth 
Quarter filed an action in federal district court in North Carolina contending that a series 
of zoning decisions by the City of Concord violated Fourth Quarter's state and federal 
constitutional rights. The case involved a detailed analysis of the municipal zoning and 
planning ordinances of the City of Concord, with federal jurisdiction resting on diversity 
of citizenship as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted Concord City's motion to 
dismiss, in part,1 and to stay, in part, but in doing so, addressed directly the issue of 
diversity jurisdiction: 
1
 Although the court in Fourth Quarter stayed certain state law claims so they could be heard in North 
Carolina state court, the Supreme Court has made clear that a district court can dismiss an action 
seeking equitable relief, such as a declaratory action. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 
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This case involves a dispute over whether the Plaintiffs' proposed 
construction complied with a city zoning ordinance, and whether city 
officials abused their authority by wrongfully denying or delaying 
construction permits. The fact that this Court has diversity jurisdiction to 
hear the state law claims does not change the fact that the central dispute 
in this case involves the interpretation of local zoning laws and that this 
zoning dispute is better heard by the state court. 
]d.*5 (Emphasis added.) 
While recognising United Park's Motion is controlled by the Tenth Circuit decision 
in Norton v. Village of Corrales, 103 F.3d, 918, (10th Cir. 1996) (Op. Memo. @ 2), 
Stichting Mayflowers' attempt to suggest that "a federal claim may well be stated" where 
a case involves discriminatory or partisan treatment by a municipality. (Emphasis 
added.) But, of course, this case does not involve a federal claim, whatsoever. The 
Amended Complaint alleges only that the failure of the Park City Council to enforce its 
own zoning code discriminates against "plaintiff and plaintiffs' property" in violation of a 
Utah building uniformity statute § 10-9-405(2) of MLUDMA (Am. Compl. fl 16). Village 
of Corrales is in full accord with the other cases cited by United Park in its Opening 
Memorandum from the Eleventh, Ninth, Seventh and First Circuits that regardless of 
whether it is federal question or diversity jurisdiction is present, a federal district court 
will not sit as a super zoning board of appeal to review municipalities' local zoning 
decisions allegedly in violation of state land zoning and planning statutes. See, e.g., 
Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 262 (11th Cir. 1989); Coniston Corporation v. 
Village of Hoffman Estates, et aL, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988); Construction 
706, 721(1996) ("We have thus held that in cases where the relief being sought is equitable in nature or 
otherwise discretionary, federal courts not only have the power to stay the action based on abstention 
principles, but can also, in otherwise appropriate circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether 
by either dismissing the suit or remanding it to state court")(emphasis added). 
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Industry Assoc, v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); Creative 
Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 (1st Cir. 1982). 
As with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Village of Corrales, the Fourth Quarter 
Properties IV Court noted that local zoning and land law is an area especially within the 
territory of state courts, particularly when interpreting a state comprehensive land use 
zoning and planning act such as MLUDMA: 
The Fourth Circuit has singled out local land use and zoning laws as 
quintessential matters of state concern, emphasizing that local zoning and 
land use law "is particularly the province of the State and that federal 
courts should be wary of intervening in that area." 
id. *5, quoting, in part, Pomponio v. Fauquier Co. Bd. Of Supervisors, 21 F.3d 1319, 
1325 (4th Cir. 1994). 
The authorities cited in this Reply Brief and in United Park's Opening 
Memorandum provide a chorus of persuasive and, indeed, controlling precedent that 
Stichting Mayflowers does not traverse. It did not even recognise or attempt to 
distinguish said cases on the authoritative principle that whether diversity or federal 
question jurisdiction is present, a federal district court will not sit as a zoning appeal 
board to review municipal land planning decisions based on the claim that such 
municipal decision violates a state zoning statute. This strong current of case law is 
particularly applicable when the state statute alleged to be violated is part of a 
comprehensive state land use and planning Act such as Utah's MLUDMA, providing for 
its own statutory review by a state district court of a local, municipal land zoning and 
planning decision. 
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II. STICHTING MAYFLOWERS' OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM PLAINLY 
DEMONSTRATES THAT ITS AMENDED COMPLAINT IS FRIVOLOUS AND 
CONTRARY TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11. 
The Opposition Memorandum adds emphasis to the conclusion that the 
Amended Complaint is a frivolous filing. It fails to cite a single case to this Court on 
point and it summarily dismisses the opinions of five Circuit Courts of Appeal that a 
federal district court will not allow a party, based on either diversity or federal question 
jurisdiction, to "shoehorn" in a local, municipal zoning and planning decision based on 
alleged violation of state law. Stichting Mayflowers and their counsel do not claim that 
the authorities confronting their position should be overturned and a new rule of law 
announced. They simply ignore the heavy weight of precedent. Faced with the 
authorities cited by United Park, no reasonable, competent attorney could have brought 
the Amended Complaint herein without first reviewing and acknowledging the existence 
of such authorities and then in good faith advocating a different rule of law. To file the 
Amended Complaint without doing so is a clear violation of Rule 11. 
The Amended Complaint should be dismissed as frivolous. United Park has 
served, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c), upon Stichting Mayflowers' 
counsel, a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, coupled with a twenty-one day Demand that it 
withdraw and voluntarily dismiss the Amended Complaint. That twenty-one day period 
expired on November 17, 2005. Accordingly, that Rule 11 Motion and Supporting 
Memorandum of Law will now be filed with this Court and served immediately following 
this Reply Memorandum. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
Based on the foregoing authorities and arguments, Stichting Mayflowers' 
Amended Complaint should be dismissed as frivolous. Oral argument is respectfully 
requested. 
Dated t h i s ^ ^ 4 — day of November, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted. 
CLARK K. TAYLOR 
STEPHEN K. CHRISTIANSEN 
of and for 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Defendant 
United Park City Mines Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the l^"4^_ day of November, 2005, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO.'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM TO STICHTING MAYFLOWERS' OPPOSITION TO UNITED PARK'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FRIVOLOUS AMENDED COMPLAINT to be served upon the 
following as follows: 
BY HAND DELIVERY AND FACSIMILE: 
E. Craig Smay 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark R. Gayiord 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
BY FIRST CLASS U.S. MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID AND FACSIMILE: 
Mark D. Harrington 
Park City Attorney 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
445 Marsac Avenue 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, UT 84060-1480 
^Jju^L.tL.^Q, 
d 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL (0557) 
CLARK K. TAYLOR (5354) 
STEPHEN K. CHRISTIANSENSEN (6512) 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058 
Attorneys for Defendant, United Park City 
Mines Company 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, Netherlands 
associations, 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, 
and 
EAST WEST PARTNERS, 
and 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO.'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
PLAINTIFFS' FRIVOLOUS AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil Number: 2.05CV00525 TS 
Honorable Ted Stewart 
United States District Judge 
r<£C£.vL3 OCT 1 8 
The Defendant, United Park City Mines Co. ("United Park"), through its counsel 
of record, herewith submits its Supporting Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion 
to Dismiss Stichting Mayflowers Mountain Fonds' and Stichting Mayflower Recreational 
Fonds1 ("Stichting Mayflowers") Frivolous Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
RELEVANT PLEADED FACTS OF PLAINTIFFS5 AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Only for the purpose of United Park's Motion to Dismiss, the following relevant 
pleaded facts are admitted: 
• On May 25, 2005, the Park City Planning Commission, over Stichting 
Mayflowers' objection, approved United Park's subdivision and development 
known as the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side (Am. Compl. 1f 13); 
• On May 26, 2005, the City Council of Park City, over Stichting Mayflowers' 
objection, approved United Park's Village at Empire Pass (Pod A), allegedly 
resulting in the Marsac Claim (as to which Stichting Mayflowers contend they 
may have some interest) being inaccessible and undevelopable (Am. Compl. 
1114); 
• That the Park City Land Management Code provides that streets are to be 
extended to boundaries of developed property unless prevented by 
topography or other physical conditions, or unless the Park City Planning 
Commission determines in its discretion that such extension is not necessary 
(Am. Compl. 1J15). 
By way of a legal and factual conclusion, the Amended Complaint then 
alleges that the failure of the Park City Council to enforce PCLMC § 15-7.3-4 the May 
Ii 
26, 2005 decision of the City Council of Park City discriminates against Stichting 
Mayflowers in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405(2) (Am. Compl. 1J16, prayer). 
A R G U M E N T 
I. THE RELEVANT PLEADED FACTS ALLEGE ONLY THAT A PARK CITY 
MUNICIPAL PLANNING AND ZONING DECISION VIOLATES A UTAH 
STATUTORY LAND DEVELOPMENT PROVISION AND AN ASPECT OF 
PARK CITY'S MUNICIPAL PLANNING CODE. 
The Amended Complaint herein can be simply put - - it is a municipal planning 
and zoning appeal, disguised under the label of a declaratory judgment action, of a local 
Park City planning and zoning decision of May 26, 2005. The basis is that it is allegedly 
discriminatory in violation of a State statute and allegedly inconsistent with Park City's 
Land Management Code. No federal constitutional or statutory question is alleged. 
To begin with, the Park City Land Management Code, which the Amended 
Complaint raises, is unexceptional. Section 15-7.3-4 states that streets within a 
subdivided property shall extend to the boundary line: 
"unless prevented by topography or other physical conditions, or unless in 
the opinion of the Planning Commission such an extension is not 
necessary . . . " 
PCLMC § 15-7.3-4. Thus the Park City Code sets forth a rule of land development with 
discretion in the planning commission, as reviewed by the Park City Council, not to 
follow the rule if believed unnecessary to coordinate a subdivision development with 
neighboring property. No allegation is made in the Amended Complaint that the City 
Council (or for that matter the Planning Commission) abused its discretion or acted 
arbitrarily or unreasonably in the approval of United Park's Village at Empire Pass (Pod 
A) West Side. 
1 
Secondly, the Utah state statute, § 10-9-405(2), alleged to be violated as 
discriminatory by the May 26, 2005 City Council planning and zoning decision, is both 
unredeeming and innocuous: 
"10-9-405. Zoning district. 
(2) The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for 
each class or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations 
in one district may differ from those in other districts." 
]d. (emphasis added). Whether § 10-9-405(2) relating to "buildings" has any 
application to this case involving approval of undeveloped land is a matter for the 
interstitial interpretation and construction of the Utah Land Planning and Zoning statute. 
But one conclusion is unmistakable, viz., § 10-9-405(2) is merely a part of the larger 
Utah Municipal Land Use Development Management Act ("MLUDMA"), which is the 
Utah Legislature's comprehensive statutory land planning and zoning law. The 
Legislature has plainly provided that if a municipal land planning or zoning decision is 
alleged to violate any part of MLUDMA, including § 10-9-405(2), a petition for review 
may be taken from such a decision within 30 days thereof to a district court. Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a), part of MLUDMA, mandates that such petition for review must 
be filed in a Utah district court: 
"Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of 
or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review 
of the decision with the district court within 30 after the local land use 
decision is final." 
jd. (emphasis added). Thus, even if the factual allegations of Stichting Mayflowers' 
Amended Complaint are assumed to be true and the quasi-factual and -legal 
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conclusions were correct (which they are not), Stichting Mayflowers' remedy for an 
appeal is a petition for review to be filed in the state district court for Summit County as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a) of MLUDMA. 
II. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DIVERSITY JURISDICTION EXISTS, 
OVERWHELMING FEDERAL CASE PRECEDENT IS ABSOLUTELY 
CLEAR THAT FEDERAL COURTS WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO 
SITTING AS A LOCAL PLANNING & ZONING BOARD OF APPEAL TO 
REVIEW A MUNICIPAL PLANNING & ZONING DECISION WHICH 
ALLEGEDLY VIOLATES STATE LAW. 
1. Utah Substantive Law is Applicable in This Diversity Case, 
It has been established law for over 200 years in this Country that a federal court, 
in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction, will apply the statutory law of the state in which it 
sits. The Judiciary Act of 1789, now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1652, makes the application 
of state law obligatory in a federal diversity case. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1841). Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), laid down the principle that state case 
law precedent is also applicable in a diversity case. 
Thus, it can not be gainsaid that Utah substantive law, statutory and case 
precedent, is applicable to Stichting Mayflowers' amended complaint. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-801(2)(a) Dictates That The Stichting 
Mayflowers' Remedy For the Claim Set Out In Its Amended Complaint is 
in Utah State District Court. 
The Utah MLUDMA is a comprehensive set of statutes of the Utah Legislature to 
deal with municipal land planning and zoning. An integral part of MLUDMA is § 10-9a-
801(2)(a) providing that a party aggrieved by a municipal planning or zoning decision 
shall have a remedy by a "petition for review" filed "with the district court" within 30 days 
of the final municipal decision. See Attachment 3. 
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Under the "plain meaning" doctrine of the Utah Supreme Court in South Salt 
Lake v. Frederick, 925 P.2d 954, 957-58 (Utah 1994), it is clear that the Utah 
Legislature, by its reference to "the district court" in § 10-9a-801(2)(a), meant the Utah 
district court in which the real property was situated. No other reasonable or good faith 
construction of the statute is possible. 
The argument of Stichting Mayflowers that they are somehow entitled to 
substitute this Court for a Utah state district court because of diversity jurisdiction and 
that a federal court is just as knowledgeable about Utah law of planning and zoning as a 
state court, simply will not wash. It would do violence to "plain meaning" to suggest that 
the Utah Legislature, by its direction that a "petition for review" should be made to "the 
district court" intended it to mean a federal district court or, for that matter a district court 
in Colorado, Idaho, or South Carolina. Moreover, it is the Utah state district courts, not 
federal or some other district court, that is familiar with the statutory land planning and 
zoning structure of MLUDMA and § 10-9-405(2) which Stitching Mayflowers claims was 
violated by the Park City Council's municipal decision of May 26, 2005. Creative 
Environments Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 (1 s t Cir. 1982). 
Under the applicable controlling law, Stitching Mayflowers' amended complaint 
belongs, if anywhere, in the state district court for Summit County, not in this Court. 
3. Federal Case Law is Unequivocal That A Federal District Court Will Not 
Sit As A Local Municipal Board of Appeal to Review Planning and 
Zoning Decisions of a Municipality. 
A mountain of federal case precedent faces Stichting Mayflowers' claim that this 
Court should now sit to review, under the guise of a declaratory action, a Park City 
municipal zoning and planning decision for its alleged violation of a state planning and 
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zoning statute, particularly where there are no federal constitutional issues raised. The 
First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F. 2d 256, 262 (11 t h Cir. 
1989), rejected such a claim and declaring unequivocally that federal courts do not sit 
as municipal zoning boards of appeal: 
"We stress that federal courts do not sit as zoning boards of review and 
should be most circumspect in determining that constitutional rights are 
violated in quarrels over zoning decisions." Raskiewicz v. Town of New 
Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) ("federal courts.do not sit as a 
super zoning board or zoning board of appeals"); Albery v. Reddig, 718 
F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1983) (federal appeals court should not become 
accustomed to idea that constitutional rights are implicated in quarrel over 
zoning rules); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(noting reluctance of federal courts to sit as zoning boards of appeal). 
873 F.2d at 262. The Ninth Circuit, in Construction Industry Assoc, v. City of Petaluma, 
522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) reached the same conclusion: 
"Being neither a super legislature nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal 
court is without authority to weigh and to reappraise the factors considered 
or ignored by the legislative body in passing the challenged zoning 
regulation.") cert, den., 424 U.S. 934 (1976)." 
Judge Posner (with Judge Easterbrook concurring) candidly stated the succinct 
proposition in Coniston Corporation v. Village of Hoffman Estates, et a!., 844 F.2d 461, 
467 (7th Cir. 1988), that the federal courts simply were not going to be a repository "to 
shoehorn" appeals from local municipal planning and zoning decisions where there are 
no federal questions presented, even though federal subject matter jurisdiction might be 
present: 
"This case presents a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the 
trappings of constitutional law. . . . If the plaintiffs can get us to review the 
merits of the Board of Trustees' decision under state law, we cannot 
imagine what zoning dispute could not be shoehorned into federal court in 
this way, . . . . Something more is necessary than dissatisfaction with the 
rejection of a site plan to turn a zoning case into a federal case; and it 
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should go without saving that the something more cannot be merely a 
violation of state (or local) law. A violation of state law is not a denial of 
due process of law (citations omitted) (emphasis added). ]d. at 467. 
The First Circuit in Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 
(1st Cir. 1982), held that federal courts do not sit to review local planning board 
decisions where there is a complex state statutory structure in place and there is a 
remedy for judicial review under the state statute: 
"But the ordinary state administrative proceeding involving land use or 
zoning does not present such a situation [involving 'recognized federal 
constitutional rights1] regardless of how disappointed the license or 
privilege seeker may feel at being initially turned down. Thus, where-as-
here the state has erected a complex statutory scheme and provided for 
avenues of appeal to the state courts, property is not denied without due 
process simply because a local planning board rejects a proposed 
development for erroneous reasons or makes demands which argueablv 
exceed its authority under relevant state statutes." k± at 832 (emphasis 
added). 
Finally, the controlling precedent of the Tenth Circuit holds to the same principle. 
In Norton et al v. Village of Corrales, 103 F.3d 928, 932-33 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth 
Circuit stated in a case where there was an attempted federal appeal from a planning 
and zoning commission decision of the Village of Corrales: 
"Actions that violate state law are properly challenged in state courts . . . 
'the legality of a zoning decision under applicable state law is not 
determinative of whether the decision violated federal substantive law'. 
Sylvia Development Corp. v. Calvart County, 48 F.3d 810, 829 (4th Cir. 
1995). . . . See E. G. Gunkel v. City of Emporia, 835 R2d 1302, 1304 
(10th Cir. 1987) (federal courts do not sit as fal 'zoning board of appeals' to 
resolve municipal zoning disputes]. . .." 
]d. at 932-33 (emphasis added) (brackets in original). 
This black letter law has been ignored by Stichting Mayflowers in the filing of their 
Amended Complaint No party can ignore this controlling law without violating the 
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provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. A dismissal of the Amended 
Complaint should be forthwith granted. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
For the reasons set forth in the Motion to Dismiss and this Memorandum, the 
Amended Complaint of Stichting Mayflowers should be dismissed with prejudice, as a 
matter of law. 
DATED this 17 day of October, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL 
CLARK K. TAYLOR 
STEPHEN K. CHRISTIANSEN 
of and for 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Defendant 
United Park City Mines Company 
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